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ABSTRACT
Cabuk, Serdar Ph.D., Purdue University, December, 2006. Network Covert Channels:
Design, Analysis, Detection, and Elimination. Major Professors: Carla E. Brodley
and Eugene H. Spaﬀord.
Indirect communication channels have been eﬀectively employed in the communi-
cations world to bypass mechanisms that do not permit direct communication between
unauthorized parties. Such covert channels emerge as a threat to information-sensitive
systems in which leakage to unauthorized parties may be unacceptable (e.g., military
systems). In this dissertation, we show that traﬃc analysis can counter traditional
event-based covert channels, which do not employ any additional scheme to obfus-
cate the channel further. For these channels, we introduce eﬀective noiseless and
noisy covert channel detection mechanisms that capture the anomalous traﬃc pat-
terns. However, because a motivated user can potentially hide the channel further, we
introduce a new family of covert channels that do not produce such anomaly. These
IP time-replay covert channels transmit covert messages by adjusting packet timings
consistent with inter-arrival time sequences that are extracts from recently recorded
normal sequences. Under certain assumptions and lowered data rates, these channels
generate output sequences that are equal in distribution to normal sequences allow-
ing them to by-pass traﬃc anomaly detection schemes that are based on distribution
analysis. Additionally, we illustrate that these channels can potentially survive chan-
nel elimination schemes such as jammers and network data pumps with lowered data
rates. Thus, we discuss two types of transformations on packet inter-arrival times to
increase the eﬃcacy of existing elimination schemes.1
1. INTRODUCTION
Consider a Multi-level Secure (MLS) system in which a malicious user Alice wishes to
leak sensitive information to Eve while sending a legitimate message to another user
Bob. Additionally, suppose that Alice and Bob have HIGH security clearances, and
Eve has a LOW security clearance. In systems where the security policy physically
separates Alice’s and Eve’s resources, this leakage is not possible and the resulting
system is called a total isolation system [1]. However, this alternative is impractical
because of under-utilization of resources. A more common approach is to allow re-
source sharing between users with diﬀerent security levels and to restrict access to
shared resources using access control schemes. In our research, we assume that a
Bell-LaPadula access control scheme is active in the system with HIGH and LOW
security levels [2]. Even though this scheme controls direct access to shared resources,
it enables Alice and Eve to establish indirect communication channels – also known as
covert channels. A covert channel is a communication channel that violates a security
policy by using shared resources in ways for which they were not initially designed.
This is a diﬀerent type of channel than the subliminal channel described in Simmons’
prisoner’s problem [3], which assumes a direct channel between Alice and Eve, and
is inherently not allowed in an MLS system. Covert channels arise in systems for
which direct access is disallowed by policy. Therefore, covert channels are a related
but diﬀerent information hiding construct as compared to other information hiding
techniques such as cryptography and steganography.
Traditionally, covert channels are characterized into two types: storage and timing
channels. A storage covert channel “involves the direct or indirect writing of a storage
location by one process and the direct or indirect reading of the storage location by
another process” [4]. A timing covert channel involves a sender process that “signals
information to another by modulating its own use of system resources (e.g., CPU2
time) in such a way that this manipulation aﬀects the real response time observed
by the second process” [4]. Covert channels can be further classiﬁed depending on
the type of the system in which they are used. A network covert channel is a covert
channel in which the shared medium is the network environment (e.g., transmission
lines, ﬁrewalls, routers, etc.). Accordingly, a single system covert channel uses the
shared resources within a single computer (e.g., ﬁles, hardware resources, operating
system components, etc.).
A crucial step in covert channel design is to ﬁnd and exploit a shared resource
that is unlikely to be used as a communication medium by design. In principle, the
less obvious the shared resource, the more stealthy the covert channel. For example:
1. The ﬁle-lock covert channel [5] exploits systems with shared ﬁle systems by
using ﬁle description tables that indicate a ﬁle’s locked/unlocked status as the
shared resource.
2. The disk-arm covert channel [6,7] exploits KVM/370 systems with a security
kernel and a shared read-only disk drive by using the position of the disk arm
as the shared resource.
3. The bus-contention covert channel [8] exploits multi-processor systems running
on a single shared bus by using the busy/idle status of the bus as the shared
resource.
Little emphasis has been given to methods for hiding the traﬃc generated by covert
channels – the secrecy of a covert channel mostly relies on the secrecy of knowing the
shared resource. Without additional techniques in place to hide the channel better, we
argue that once this shared resource is identiﬁed, the traﬃc generated by an event-
based covert channel can be distinguished from the traﬃc generated by legitimate
channels in the system. To see this, suppose that Alice and Eve use a shared resource
to communicate via a covert channel. To signal one bit of information to Eve, Alice
generates an event that alters the state of this shared variable. As an example, two3
events that alter the ﬁle description table in the ﬁle-lock channel are lock file and
unlock file. To transmit a series of signals to Eve, Alice subsequently generates the
corresponding events each separated by a timing interval that is either constant (i.e.,
a storage channel) or picked from a small set that is used repetitively (i.e., a timing
channel). The resulting sequence is an event sequence that is composed of 2-tuples
(E,t), where E is an event and t is a point in time. In the ﬁrst part of this disser-
tation, we argue that event sequences generated by an unhidden event-based covert
channel can be distinguished from event sequences generated by legitimate channels
because the former shows a more regular pattern caused by the encoding scheme that
generates repeating inter-event times. Hence, if the shared resource that the covert
channel uses is identiﬁed, the channel can be detected by examining the event traﬃc it
generates. In the second part of the dissertation, we illustrate ways to hide the chan-
nel further by replaying event sequences generated by legitimate channels to create
network covert channels that are virtually undetectable through traﬃc distribution
analysis. To counter these channels for which our detection schemes fail, we present
ways to eliminate and/or rate-limit them.
1.1 Research Objectives and Contributions
Our research addresses event-based network covert channels that arise in dis-
tributed TCP/IP MLS systems even when the transmission lines between network
nodes are controlled. In this dissertation, we show that traﬃc analysis can counter
traditional event-based covert channels, which do not employ any additional scheme
to obfuscate the channel further, although rate-limited and more complex channels
can be indistinguishable from normal channels through traﬃc distribution analysis.
To prove this statement, we provide answers to two questions: How can we design
network covert channels using the TCP/IP protocol that leak information from Alice
to Eve? How can the system detect and eliminate such leakage? In particular,4
1. We present and implement an IP covert channel prototype using a novel design
in which we use IP packet timings to transmit covert information over the
network eﬀectively.
2. We introduce novel detection measures that eﬀectively detect both noiseless and
noisy IP covert channels (and all event-based covert channels in general) using
traﬃc analysis and force malicious users to either design more complex channels
and/or rate-limit the channel to avoid detection.
3. We introduce time-replay covert channels (TRCC) that are a covert channel
family that hides event-based channels, and argue that TRCCs are virtually
undetectable through distribution analysis under certain assumptions.
4. We discuss prevention and elimination techniques for time-replay covert chan-
nels that aid current elimination schemes in stopping these channels.
Additionally, we provide simple accuracy and bandwidth analysis for both un-
hidden and hidden IP covert channels and investigate the eﬃcacy of detection and
elimination techniques through an experimental study. Next, we detail each contri-
bution further.
1.1.1 Designing Unhidden Network Covert Channels
Our research initially focused on designing event-based storage and timing covert
channels which we call IP simple covert channels (SCC). Our design of IP SCCs use
the packet arrival as the event and employ the inter-arrival times between the IP
packets to convey information in distributed MLS systems. While simple in concept,
there proved to be some non-obvious issues in creating the channel and designing
the software. One subtle issue is the synchronization of Alice and Eve’s event clocks
to guarantee channel accuracy. Because IP packets oﬀer no guarantees on the time
of packet deliveries, we employ additional schemes to preserve synchronization and5
resynchronize the channel as needed. In the presence of these factors that intro-
duce noise into the covert channel, we assess the eﬃcacy of IP SCCs in terms of
bit/character accuracy (the number of bits/characters transmitted correctly divided
by the total number of bits/characters) and channel bandwidth. To do so, we per-
form basic accuracy and bandwidth analysis for both noiseless and noisy IP SCCs. We
show that two factors aﬀect channel eﬃcacy: Contention noise, which is the amount
of non-covert traﬃc Eve observes in the covert channel and can potentially reduce
channel accuracy [9], and clock skew, which is the amount of jitter in the network and
can potentially result in the loss of synchronization between Alice’s and Eve’s event
clocks.
1.1.2 Countering Unhidden Network Covert Channels
To counter these channels, we investigate IP SCC detection, elimination, and
rate-limiting techniques and introduce methods to detect both noiseless and noisy
IP SCCs. Our analysis of the behavior of IP SCCs illustrates that both storage and
timing channels show some type of regularity in packet inter-arrival times. This is an
expected behavior for storage channels, because they have a ﬁxed timing interval to
send/not send the packets. In contrast, timing channels do not use constant timing
intervals. However, in a straightforward implementation, a symbol is sent using only a
limited number of these timing intervals and these intervals repeat over time. Hence,
the packet inter-arrival times for both storage and timing IP SCCs are repetitive. For
example, the inter-arrival times for a storage covert channel in Figure 1.1(a) illustrate
this regularity as compared to a sample WWW trace (Figure 1.1(b)) taken from the
NZIX-II dataset [10], in which no such regularity can be deduced. For such legitimate
channels, user and network aﬀects can potentially be observed on the traﬃc pattern
on a longer window. However, we claim that, in most cases (e.g., except streaming
traﬃc), legitimate traﬃc patterns are much less repetitive than IP SCC traﬃc.6
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Fig. 1.1. Inter-arrival times for diﬀerent traﬃc types. (a) A simulated
IP storage SCC with τ =0 .2 secs (no clock skew). (b) An example
WWW traﬃc.
To detect this type of regularity, we introduce two measures that can be used for
online (i.e., real-time) detection and evaluate their capabilities in an experimental
study using our covert channel software in a real-world scenario. Further, we show
that our detection measures fail for noisy covert channels for noise levels higher than
10%. To counter this deﬁciency, we investigate eﬀective yet computationally expensive
search mechanisms to locate the hidden covert channels locally for which the global
measures fail. An important observation here is that this regularity characteristic is
not limited solely to the channels we designed but to all event-based covert channels.
Hence, our detection measures can be employed not only for IP SCCs but for any
channel that is based on event timings.
1.1.3 Designing Hidden Network Covert Channels
Despite the characteristic regularity of IP SCCs and event-based channel channels
in general, more sophisticated schemes that better hide the channel can be devised. In
the second part of our research, we introduce Time-Replay Covert Channels (TRCC)
which are speciﬁcally designed to hide covert traﬃc by adjusting packet timings con-
sistent with inter-arrival time sequences that are extracts from recently recorded7
normal sequences under similar network conditions. Such time-replay channels rep-
resent a family of covert channels rather than a particular channel or a channel type.
We ﬁrst detail the channel model for IP TRCCs that use network packet timings to
transmit data and hide the covert channel within legitimate IP traﬃc. We illustrate
that using a simple IP channel, called the binary-matching channel, Alice and Eve
can exchange messages eﬀectively over the network with high accuracy and secrecy.
Further, we investigate the channel eﬃcacy of IP TRCCs and assess it in terms of
bit/character accuracy (the number of bits/characters transmitted correctly divided
by the total number of bits/characters) and channel bandwidth. We observe that in
addition to contention noise and clock skew as in IP SCCs, a third factor, sequence
selection (i.e., which sequence the time-replay covert channel uses) plays a major role
in channel accuracy and bandwidth.
1.1.4 Countering Hidden Network Covert Channels
To counter IP TRCCs, we investigate covert channel detection, elimination, and
prevention techniques. We ﬁrst investigate online (i.e., real-time) detection and elim-
ination schemes that are applicable to IP time-replay covert channels and the con-
ditions under which these schemes are eﬀective. Because IP TRCCs use replays of
inter-arrival sequences extracted from legitimate sources, the traﬃc pattern shows
no regularity as in the case of IP SCCs and the regularity-based detection measures
do not apply to these channels. Further, we show that a sophisticated attacker can
potentially devise and utilize covert time sequences that are equal in distribution to
normal sequences that were generated by legitimate channels. Thereby creating re-
play covert channels that are undetectable through analyzing localized distribution of
inter-arrival times. To deal with these channels, we provide a discussion on how the
existing covert channel elimination schemes need to be revised to eliminate the new
class of covert channels we introduce. To do so, we focus on two covert channel elimi-
nation schemes, jamming [11] and the network pump [12], and provide a discussion on8
their eﬀectiveness on IP TRCCs. We show that the binary-matching channel may sur-
vive these elimination schemes with a slightly lowered data rate. (The actual amount
by which the data rate is reduced depends on the amount of added average delay to
the packets.) We argue that to eliminate these channels, elimination schemes need to
transform packet timings more intelligently to remove the associations between the
timing values and symbols.
1.2 Signiﬁcance of the Work
Handling covert channels, that is identifying, analyzing, limiting, and eliminating
these channels, is particularly important for multi-level secure (MLS) systems, in
which processes may leak information to other processes with a lower classiﬁcation
level via the use of shared resources [13]. Indeed, the original (but now obsolete1)
evaluation criteria for trusted computer systems (TCSEC: 1983–1999 – The Orange
Book) included requirements to analyze covert channels in terms of their bandwidth
and to develop policies to monitor and maintain their bandwidth below maximum
acceptable levels [4]. TCSEC required storage channel analysis for a B2 system, and
a complete analysis for B3 and higher assurance level systems. These requirements
were also carried to the new version of evaluation criteria: the Common Criteria (CC:
1998–Present) [14]. CC requires covert channel analysis for an EAL5 assurance level
as well as a systematic search for covert channels for EAL6 and higher assurance
levels.
Despite their importance in secure systems, auditing and detecting covert channels
have received less attention compared to other covert channel handling techniques.
Furthermore, covert channel detection still remains a novel area often confused with
covert channel identiﬁcation (as in [15,16]). The identiﬁcation problem is to discover
the potential covert channels that can be realized in the analyzed system. In contrast,
covert channel detection mechanisms are similar to intrusion detection systems. The
1Replaced by Common Criteria (CC) in 1999.9
essential task in covert channel detection is to detect anomalous traﬃc patterns that
can potentially signal the use of a covert channel. In addition to this, an ideal
detection scheme would be the one that identiﬁes the communicating parties, the
information transferred, and the channel capacity.
Network covert channels are particularly important when the receiver of the (di-
rect) channel (i.e., Bob) is not in the same system as the sender (i.e., Alice) and the
access is controlled between the two. These channels pose a threat to distributed sys-
tems in which sensitive information is stored. This is because once an attacker (i.e.,
Eve) implants a back-door into one of these systems, she can now steal information
by leaking it through the covert channel that can be established using the back-door
program. Moreover, even without the presence of this back-door, Eve can monitor
the traﬃc between Alice and Bob to gather information Alice is leaking. Without
these channels, this scenario is not possible because direct access to the untrusted
parties (e.g., the nodes outside the trusted network), including Eve, is controlled by
policy.
Detection is a common practice in secure systems to monitor malicious activ-
ity [14]. Detecting covert channels is desirable for three reasons:
1. Detection provides a mechanism to discourage the use of these channels and
may work as a deterrent [5].
2. Most covert channel identiﬁcation systems need input from system analysts
(i.e., to specify the shared resources). As a result of human error, a number of
covert channels may remain unidentiﬁed. Detection can help record the activity
of these channels.
3. Covert channel elimination can be costly for high performance systems [17].
In this case, allowing these channels to exist but monitoring their activity is
crucial.
The following type of systems can potentially beneﬁt from covert channel detection
and elimination techniques:10
High-assurance Systems: Covert channel elimination schemes usually have a neg-
ative performance impact on the system [17]. In high-assurance systems (e.g.,
real time systems) these schemes are not practical. Therefore, allowing these
channels to exist, but monitoring their activity, is desirable both to deter the
usage of such channels, and to detect the actively running ones in the system.
Military Systems: In a military system, identifying spying users or processes are as
important as limiting them. Such spy networks are potentially dangerous and
identifying their users can enable authorities take further actions against such
users. This way, potential future actions of these users may also be prevented.
As a ﬁnal note, in both applications, the detection mechanisms can potentially run
at the front end of the elimination protocols. This way, the elimination schemes may
be activated only if there is a suspicious activity in the network. This architecture
helps reduce the negative performance impact of the elimination schemes in addition
to enabling authorities to identify the users of the covert channel.
1.3 Dissertation Outline
In this dissertation, we ﬁrst provide a complete background on covert channel
research in Chapter 2. In Chapter 3, we introduce the IP simple covert channel,
which is a trivial (i.e., unhidden) covert channel implementation that uses packet
timings to convey secret information. In the same chapter, we investigate detection
schemes that counter these channels and report the results of our experimental study
on detection eﬃcacy. In Chapter 4, we introduce a novel covert channel family, time-
replay covert channels, that hide the covert channel using replays of legitimate traﬃc
traces. These channels are resilient against the detection methods that we introduce
in Chapter 3 and to counter them, we discuss prevention and elimination techniques
speciﬁcally adapted to disrupt the channel activity in the same chapter. We present
our conclusions in Chapter 5 and provide insight on future directions one could take
as a continuation to this work.11
2. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
Computer resources are scarce; so much so that dedicating these resources to individ-
ual entities is not a common practice in wide-area systems because of the cost and
under-utilization of the resources. Today, the general trend is to maximize the utiliza-
tion of these resources even in single systems through technologies such as virtualiza-
tion [18] and grid-computing. As a result, we have systems in which the resources are
utilized among many entities with diﬀerent sensitivity levels. However, the sharing
of these resources creates potential unauthorized communication channels between
these entities, such as covert communication channels. A covert channel ﬁnds indi-
rect ways to exploit and use the shared resources to establish stealth communication
channels. These channels are then used to leak sensitive information to unauthorized
parties. To limit these channels in secure systems, resource sharing between diﬀerent
security levels needs to be well-deﬁned and controlled. The resulting secure system
with controlled resource sharing is called a multi-level secure (MLS) system. More
precisely, an MLS system is a computer environment in which a number of users
with diﬀerent security levels share computer resources. The access to these resources,
most importantly read and write permission, is often controlled using access control
mechanisms.
In this chapter, we give a brief introduction to the conﬁnement problem and a
complete background on covert channels in MLS systems. Since Lampson’s identiﬁ-
cation of covert and storage channels, research in this area has focused on creating,
identifying, analyzing, eliminating, limiting, auditing, and detecting these channels.
The ﬁrst step in covert channel handling is to search for potential covert channels
and identify them. Once these channels are identiﬁed, their capabilities must be an-
alyzed to assess the risk they pose to the system. Typically, an assessment calculates
the channel capacity. This analysis is particularly important because closing covert12
channels can be costly; thus, we need to focus merely on high-capacity channels. Af-
ter these potentially dangerous channels are identiﬁed, eliminating and limiting these
channels must be considered. An easy way to eliminate all covert channels and move
to a total isolation system would be to disallow the sharing of all resources between
diﬀerent security levels. When this scenario is not practical, the elimination methods
mimic this idea to provide means of isolation. Finally, less attention has been paid
to auditing and detecting covert channels. In the literature, the detection problem
is often confused with the identiﬁcation problem (as in [15,16]). The identiﬁcation
problem is to discover the potential covert channels that can be realized in the an-
alyzed environment, whereas the detection problem is to detect an actively running
covert channel. Next, we provide details on the conﬁnement problem and covert
communication channels.
2.1 Conﬁnement and Information Flow
To design access control schemes in MLS systems, the goal is to conﬁne users to
their security levels and regulate their interactions with other users and resources as
much as possible. This problem is called the conﬁnement problem,w h i c hw a sﬁ r s t
identiﬁed by Lampson [1]. As deﬁned there, the problem is how to prevent a service
leaking information to its owner while serving a customer. In [1], Lampson illustrates
several examples to leak information, which he identiﬁes as legitimate, storage, and
covert channels.
Lipner argues that Lampson’s storage and legitimate channels can be closed using
access control mechanisms, but closing the covert channel would be too costly [19]
(e.g., dedicating one CPU to each user). Instead of dedicating separate resources to
each user, a proposed solution to the conﬁnement problem is to virtually separate the
users. One way to do this is by implementing virtual machines. A virtual machine is
a simulator program that mimics a physical computer(see [20]) and provides a virtual
separation of system resources made available to each user. One such example is the13
KVM/370 system [21]. This security kernel provides virtual machines to its users
and each virtual machine is given the same security clearance as its user. No direct
communication is allowed between diﬀerent “machines” if they belong to diﬀerent
security levels. Another solution to the conﬁnement problem is to use sand-boxing
to conﬁne the process’ actions and information ﬂow models to control the ﬂow of
information between the users (e.g., [22]).
Nevertheless, it has been shown that none of these traditional techniques com-
pletely counter the covert channel threat. For example, both access control schemes
and virtual machines provide a sense of separation of diﬀerent security levels by re-
stricting the direct access between these levels and can be thought of as mimicking
a total isolation system [1]. However, neither model is secure against indirect com-
munication methods (i.e., covert channels). Lipner suggests that Lampson’s storage
channels can be eliminated using access control schemes. However, to do so, each
resource in the system needs to be carefully evaluated to determine if it can be used
as a communication medium [23].
In our research, we assume that the system is secured for direct access using access
control mechanisms to protect the system policies. The Bell-LaPadula model is a well
known example, which combines mandatory and discretionary access controls [2].
In this model, the users are seen as subjects and each subject is given a security
clearance. Each resource is an object and has a security classiﬁcation. Without loss of
generality, we assume that the system has HIGH and LOW clearance and classiﬁcation
levels for subjects and objects, respectively. The model works on two principles: a
LOW clearance subject cannot read a HIGH classiﬁed object (read-up), and a HIGH
clearance subject cannot write to a LOW classiﬁed object (write-down) [2].
In our scenario, the covert channel sender (Alice) and receiver (Eve) are subjects
with HIGH and LOW security clearances, respectively. The shared resource is an ob-
ject with HIGH security classiﬁcation. Therefore, Eve cannot read from this resource
directly because this is disallowed by policy. The receiver may be an automated14
process (i.e., a back-door) leaking information to its master1.Atrojan horse is one
such program that performs back-door activity to steal information. These programs
usually arrive at the user environment through legitimate channels (i.e., through e-
mail) and their installation usually does not violate system policies (i.e., no read-up
or write-down is needed).
2.2 Covert Communication Channels
2.2.1 Channel Deﬁnition and Types
A covert channel is a general term used to deﬁne a mechanism that can be used to
violate a security policy by allowing sensitive information to leak to an unauthorized
party. To bypass the access control schemes in MLS systems, covert channels use the
shared resources in ways not intended in their design. Examples of covert channels
were ﬁrst identiﬁed as a part of the conﬁnement problem [1]. In such examples, the
servicing process (i.e., the sender) leaks information shared between the customer and
the service to the service owner (i.e., the receiver) by modifying the ﬁle access and
processor usage. The three classic examples are the ﬁle-lock [5], the disk-arm [6,7],
and the bus-contention [8] covert channels. For example, the ﬁle-lock channel is
implemented by a sender process locking a shared ﬁle to send a one, and releasing
it to send a zero [5]. The receiver process then tries to access the ﬁle. It records a
one if it can access the ﬁle, and a zero otherwise. Another example is the disk-arm
channel identiﬁed in the KVM/370 security kernel of the systems with a shared read-
only disk drive [6,7]. In this channel, the receiver process uses the direction of the
disk head to observe the sender process’ actions. To send a one, the sender process
seeks to the inner cylinders on the disk, and to send a zero, it seeks to the outer
cylinders. The receiver process then issues two reads: one from the inner cylinder
and one from the outer. Depending on which read completes ﬁrst, the receiver decides
1In highly controlled environments where all communication channels are monitored, Alice may also
want to leak information covertly to avoid detection.15
whether the sender has issued a one or zero. The disk-arm channel is an example
showing that virtually separating the processes, as in KVM/370, is not suﬃcient for
total isolation. Hu [8] introduced the bus-contention channel, which exploits systems
with multi-processors running on a single bus. To send a one, the sender process
issues several CPU calls saturating the bus. To send a zero, it stays idle. The receiver
process continuously generates CPU calls and records a zero if the responses are faster
than a pre-speciﬁed threshold, and a one otherwise.
Covert channels can be characterized in variety of diﬀerent ways: depending on the
type of shared resource used (storage or timing), the noise level (noiseless or noisy),
the type of the system they are found in (single or distributed), and the participation
of the source (active or passive).
Storage versus Timing Covert Channels
A covert storage channel “involves the direct or indirect writing of a storage lo-
cation by one process and the direct and indirect reading of the storage location by
another process” [4]. A timing covert channel involves a sender process that “signals
information to another by modulating its own use of system resources (e.g., CPU
time) in such a way that this manipulation aﬀects the real response time observed
by the second process” [4]. Our use of terminology is the same as that found in
Lampson [1].
The classiﬁcation of covert channels into storage and timing is not clear cut and
diﬀerent deﬁnitions exist in the literature. In reality, this classiﬁcation is only useful
when the channel capacity is calculated. In capacity analysis, we need to make a
distinction between storage and timing channels. This is because in storage channels,
the time to send each symbol is constant, whereas in timing channels the time varies
each time the symbol is sent (see Section 2.2.3).16
An alternative covert channel deﬁnition was given by Kemmerer [23] as a list of
conditions for storage and timing channels. A covert channel is a storage channel if
the following conditions are met:
1. The sending and receiving processes must be able to access to a common at-
tribute of a shared resource.
2. The sender must be able to force this shared attribute to change.
3. The receiver must be able to recognize this change.
4. The sender and receiver must be able to initiate this conversation (i.e., using a
lower bandwidth channel).
According to these criteria, the disk-arm channel discussed above is a storage
channel. In this example, the receiver and the sender processes share a common
attribute (i.e., the cylinder head) of a shared resource (i.e., the hard drive); the
sender can force this attribute to change (i.e., by moving the head); and the receiver
can recognize this change (i.e., by examining the read ﬁnish time). Additionally, the
processes need to negotiate on a start time, which can be accomplished by using
another low-bandwidth channel. Similarly, the ﬁle-lock channel is also a storage
channel.
Similar criteria for timing channels are:
1. The sending and receiving processes must have access to a common attribute
of a shared resource.
2. The sender and receiver must share a reference clock.
3. The sender must be able to modulate the receiver’s response time for detecting
a change in this attribute.
4. The sender and receiver must be able to initiate this conversation (i.e., using a
lower bandwidth channel).17
The bus-contention channel presented above is a timing channel. Timing channels
require access to a reference clock shared between the sender and receiver. In most
systems, the system clock is shared between diﬀerent security levels and can serve as
a reference clock. If no such global clock is available, the receiver can still monitor the
number of instructions generated by the CPU to measure the progress of time [24].
Assuming that the parties share a reference clock in the bus-contention channel, the
sender and receiver both have access to a shared resource (i.e., the system bus); and
the sender process can modulate the receiver’s response time (i.e., by congesting the
bus or staying idle). And lastly, the parties need to negotiate on a start time (e.g.,
by using another low-bandwidth channel).
Observe that, according to this criteria, the disk-arm channel discussed above
may also be classiﬁed as a timing channel. This is because the sender modulates the
response time for the receiver process by positioning the disk head on diﬀerent cylinder
positions. This is exactly the condition required in the third Kemmerer criterion for
timing channels. Because of this property, the disk-arm channel is sometimes referred
to as a timing channel with a storage exploitation [24,25]. However, this is not true
for the bus-contention channel, as it uses a logical shared resource (the busy/idle
status of the bus).
The disk-arm channel example shows that the above criteria for channel classi-
ﬁcation by Kemmerer is ambiguous. This ambiguity can be eliminated by deﬁning
covert hybrid channels2, which use shared resources with both timing and storage
characteristics. A non-ambiguous deﬁnition is given by Moskowitz et al [17], in which
the storage channel is deﬁned as a channel “where the output alphabet consist of
diﬀerent responses all taking the same time to be transmitted”. A timing channel
is thus a channel “where the output alphabet is made up of diﬀerent time values
corresponding to the same response”. According to this deﬁnition, both disk-arm
and bus-contention channels are timing channels. The ﬁle-lock channel is a storage
channel. In our research, we use Moskowitz’s deﬁnition to classify our covert channels.
2This is our terminology. These channels are sometimes referred as mix channels [17].18
As a ﬁnal note, we need to emphasize that none of the channel deﬁnitions above
explicitly specify how long the receiving process needs to observe the channel for one
bit of information. For example, to send a bit stream 001 using the ﬁle-lock chan-
nel, the sender process needs to release-release-lock the ﬁle in that order. However,
without specifying a timing interval (τ), it is not possible for the receiving process to
observe two consecutive zeros. Similarly, the receiver cannot distinguish consecutive
ones. However, this is only a problem for storage channels, because in timing channels
the timing of the events is deﬁned implicitly. Moreover, the above is true for all stor-
age channels except those that do not use repeating symbols to send information. For
most storage channels the sender uses the same events (i.e., locking a ﬁle) to output
the same output symbols. These symbols belong to the alphabet used in encoding the
messages. Unless this encoding is chosen such that no symbol repeats consecutively,
there must be a pre-speciﬁed interval that the receiver process observes, and, for ex-
ample, records two ones if the ﬁle remains locked for two intervals. However, this
alternative solution reduces the message space substantially. For example, given an
alphabet consisting of n diﬀerent symbols and messages of m length, the number of
diﬀerent messages is limited to n(n−1)m−1 instead of nm. This suggests that storage
channels have a 5th criterion:
5. Unless a special encoding is chosen to avoid consecutive symbols, the sender
and receiver must be able to pre-negotiate on a timing interval τ during which
the receiving process will observe the change in the channel.
In this framework, the ﬁle-lock channel receiver observes the ﬁle for the duration
of the timing interval to decide on the bit the HIGH sender has intended to send.
If it decides the ﬁle is locked, it records a one, idles for the rest of the interval, and
restarts observing the ﬁle in the next interval. Otherwise, it records a zero and the
rest is the same as the one case.
Two other variations on covert channels have been introduced in the literature.
The covert sorting channel puts emphasis on the ordering of the events observed in19
a timing interval [26,27]. In sorting channels, the covert information is transmitted
by the order of a set of events. For example, if the receiver is monitoring n events
given a timing interval, then the occurrence of n events in a particular order transmits
one message from message space of size n!. Another variation is the covert counting
channel, which transmits information by the number of occurrences of a single set of
events [28].
Noisy versus Noiseless Covert Channels
If a shared resource is used not only by the covert channel parties but also by other
legitimate users, the resulting channel is a noisy communication channel. Speciﬁcally,
a noisy covert channel is a channel in which both normal and covert traﬃc are ob-
served. In contrast, in a noiseless covert channel, the shared resource is solely used by
the parties involved in the covert communication. The channel noise described here
is not signal noise, but is contention noise caused by the contention for the shared
resources [9]. Noise is a degrading factor in covert channel accuracy. For example, in
the ﬁle-lock channel, the shared ﬁle may also be locked by other legitimate processes.
This deteriorates the channel accuracy, because the LOW process can no longer mon-
itor the HIGH process’ activity alone. The eﬀects of noise in covert channels have
been analyzed to estimate channel capacity. Introducing noise into covert channels
has also been illustrated as a way limiting covert channel bandwidth. We present
these techniques in Section 2.2.4.
Network Covert Channels
A network covert channel is a covert channel in which the shared medium is the
network environment (i.e., the transmission lines, ﬁrewalls, routers, etc.). File-lock,
disk-arm, and bus-contention channels are all single system covert channels. This
is because the resources shared by these channels all belong to a central computer20
environment. Initial research in covert channels focused on single systems. However,
these results can be easily extended to include network channels [29].
Network covert channels have been used by attackers to communicate with com-
promised hosts (i.e., zombies), particularly in distributed denial of service (DDOS)
attacks [30]. Many tools exist for setting up network covert channels using a variety of
protocols including TCP, IP, HTTP, ICMP, AODV, and MAC protocols [26,27,31–44].
The common practice in most of these examples is to encapsulate covert channels in
legitimate protocols to bypass ﬁrewalls and content ﬁlters.
The data section of packets is the easiest place to convey covert information,
because of its large size and because it is relatively unstructured compared to headers.
Modifying the packet payload, which is used in steganography to hide data, is outside
the scope of our research. Unused header ﬁelds that are either designed for future
protocol improvements or in general go unchecked by ﬁrewalls and network intrusion
detection devices may convey information in the form of a covert channel. Many
covert channels have been illustrated in TCP and IP protocols using packet header
ﬁelds [26,27,31,32,34–37,39,41,43,44]. Rowland [44] illustrates three examples of
covert storage channels. The ﬁrst encodes the messages into the identiﬁcation ﬁeld
(ID) of an IP header. The second embeds the messages into the initial sequence
number (ISN) ﬁeld of a TCP header. And the third uses the TCP ACK sequence
number ﬁeld. An improved version of Rowland’s TCP ISN covert channel, Nushu,
is presented in [43]. The main diﬀerence between Rowland’s TCP ISN channel and
Nushu is that Nushu encrypts the TCP ISN ﬁeld to make it look like a random
number to better obscure the channel. A smart attacker can even devise means to
use some of the header ﬁelds that do fall under scrutiny, such as the IP checksum ﬁeld.
Abad [31] illustrates that the sender can send any message using hash collision in the
checksum ﬁeld. Sorting covert channels have been devised for the TCP/IP protocol,
in which it is the ordering of the packets that transmits the covert information to the
receiver side [26,27]. However, for this channel to work, the receiver needs to know
the correct ordering of the packets. Therefore, these channels require the use of the21
IPSEC protocol, which provides the original order in which the packets were sent.
Murdoch et al [40] argue that the previous eﬀorts to hide covert channels in packet
header ﬁelds alters the behavior of these ﬁelds. They claim that this change can be
detected and introduce Lathra, a covert channel that uses the TCP ISN ﬁeld, but
tries to mirror the ISN generation process to avoid detection.
TCP and IP are not the only protocols used for covert channel exploitation. Re-
verse WWW Shell is a covert shell that uses HTTP request parameters to leak in-
formation [39]. In this channel, the sender issues a HTTP GET command with the
speciﬁed parameters, bypasses the HTTP-only ﬁrewall, and leaks the information to
the receiver side. Another HTTP covert channel was illustrated by Bauer [32] for
privacy purposes. In this channel the sender wants to remain unlinkable, hence it
redirects the communication via an unwitting client’s browser. The author shows
that this is possible using redirects, cookies, active content, etc. ICMP packets have
also been used to host covert shells. The Loki covert shell runs on ICMP and uses the
data portions of the ICMP ECHO packet to send a command to a remote receiver [34,35].
The receiver back-door then executes this command on the victim computer, and re-
turns the result embedded in the data portion of the ICMP ECHOREPLY packet. A list
of similar covert shells developed by the black hat community can be found in [37].
Other interesting examples of covert channels were illustrated in the OSI protocol
stack [42], in LAN networks [38,45], and in ad-hoc wireless networks [33]. In LAN
networks, the destination ID, the packet length, the time between successive transmis-
sions [42], and the number of collisions in a resolution period (in MAC protocol) [45]
were used. In ad-hoc networks, Li et al [33] identify four covert channels in AODV
routing protocol. The authors consider the timing between the route requests, the
source sequence number, the lifetime ﬁeld, and the destination ID.
At this point, we need to emphasize that although the above channel examples are
referred to as “network covert channels” in the literature, they rely on information
hiding principles [25]. That is, these channels use resources (i.e., packet headers) that
are directly accessible by the communicating parties, unlike the covert channels in22
MLS systems. The network channels we introduce in our work are covert channels
because we do not assume direct access to the packets transmitted over the network.
Active versus Passive Covert Channels
In the literature, covert channels are usually referred to as communication chan-
nels with an active sender and a receiver. The sender of this channel is usually a
malicious software component actively leaking information. However, the source of
this communication channel does not need to be active for a covert channel to exist
and a LOW receiver can still gain bits of information even if the HIGH source does
not actively leak information. Therefore, we make a distinction between active and
passive sources. An active-source covert channel is the one with a trojaned source
actively leaking information. A passive-source covert channel exists with no partic-
ipating source. Covert channels described in the literature are usually active source
channels. However, this may lead to the false implication that a system free of ma-
licious software is also free of covert channels. In fact, it is a popular practice for
password crackers to observe the running time of password checking algorithms to
extract information. The resulting communication channel in which the sender is the
algorithm and the receiver is the cracker is a passive-source covert timing channel.
Finally, our research does not focus on the following information hiding techniques.
The subliminal channel was ﬁrst introduced in [3] as a solution to the prisoner’s prob-
lem. Simmons describes this problem as follows: Two prisoners are placed in two far
cells and want to coordinate an escape plan. Exchanging messages is allowed, however
the messages are open to the guardian. Moreover, the guardian may introduce fraud-
ulent messages to deceive them. Therefore, they need to authenticate the messages.
The channel the prisoners establish to deceive the guardian is called the subliminal
channel. These channels are considered as a special type of covert channels, and cryp-
tographic protocols are used to implement them [46,47]. However, they are diﬀerent23
from Lampson’s deﬁnition of covert channels in MLS systems because direct access
to the shared resource is allowed.
Second, steganographic techniques were illustrated to hide information into a di-
rectly accessible resource (e.g., a picture) in ways to prevent detection (e.g., unde-
tectable to human eye). Detection of these concealed messages has also received
signiﬁcant attention (see [48]). Similar to subliminal channels, steganoraphic proto-
cols work on information hiding principles, hence again are diﬀerent from Lampson’s
deﬁnition of covert channels in MLS systems.
2.2.2 Channel Identiﬁcation
Several methods were proposed for identifying covert channels in MLS systems [16,
23,49–52]. In one of the early examples, Denning et al [49] use lattice models to iden-
tify storage channels by determining insecure information ﬂows between the subjects.
They particularly focus on identifying the implicit ﬂows, which are not obvious from
analyzing the direct (explicit) ﬂows. The following techniques all identify these im-
plicit ﬂows between the resource attributes and the primitive operations by using
diﬀerent data structures (e.g., resource matrices, ﬂow trees, messaging charts). The
resource matrix was the ﬁrst such data structure used to visually identify covert stor-
age channels [23]. In this shared resource methodology (SRM), the attributes and
operations are the rows and columns of a matrix, respectively. The relation between
these attributes and operations are then represented in the matrix cells. Moreover,
the implicit ﬂows are identiﬁed by taking a form of transitive closure of the matrix.
In [23], Kemmerer et al argue that timing channels can be represented with this ma-
trix by including the system time as an attribute. But this methodology was mainly
designed for storage channels and extending it to include the timing channels does
not guarantee the identiﬁcation of all timing channels in the system. A less eﬃcient
but more eﬀective data structure is the covert ﬂow tree (CFT). CFT is a data struc-
ture that is used in goal-directed deductive reasoning. Porras et al [50] use the same24
goal-oriented approach using goals such as “Covert Storage Channel via Attribute
A”, and create CFT trees for each goal. Traversing this tree tells us whether this
goal is achievable or not. In comparison to SRM methodology, CFT trees provide a
more natural but less eﬃcient technique to analyze the storage channels with multiple
resource exploitation.
Both the SRM and CFT methods were initially designed for single systems but can
be extended to network channels. A more natural way to represent the interactions
in network channels is by using message sequence charts (MSC). Helouet et al [16]
illustrate how to use MSCs to identify storage channels at the requirements level of
a software development cycle, however they do not provide analysis of how MSCs
can be used to detect implicit ﬂows that use multiple attributes to leak information.
Tsai et al [51] argue that all of the above methods are high-level analysis techniques
and the covert channels identiﬁed at these levels (e.g., at the requirements level)
may not represent all channels that might occur in the source level. The authors
provide a detailed method that can be applied at the source-level which includes the
identiﬁcation of implicit ﬂows by analyzing the direct and indirect visibility of the
attributes. However, both SRM and CFT are generic methods and are not restricted
to a high-level (e.g., requirement level) analysis, although using these methods for
source-level analysis may be ineﬃcient (especially CFT). Lastly, a technique similar
to SRM is used in [52]. In this method, covert channels with the same sender and
receiver are aggregated. This is particularly useful when the communicating parties
use more than one medium to communicate covertly in an attempt to create seemingly
unimportant low bandwidth channels.
Except for the SRM methodology, none of the methods presented above focus
on timing channels. Additionally, most of these techniques depend on the system
analyst’s input to the identiﬁcation algorithm. Therefore, in all of the techniques the
methods require manually identifying all of the attributes of all shared resources in the
system. Covert channels exploit an attribute of a resource that is not initially thought
to be used as a communication medium (e.g., the disk cylinder head). Therefore, it25
is possible that one of these attributes will be overlooked and a covert channel can
be established later by exploiting this attribute.
2.2.3 Channel Analysis
The second step in covert channel handling is the analysis of each identiﬁed chan-
nel to assess the threat level of each covert channel. Essentially, the amount of
information that leaks through these channels needs to be calculated to identify high-
capacity channels for closure or rate limitation. Tsai et al [53] analyze covert storage
channel bandwidth using Markov models applied to both noiseless and noisy channels.
The bandwidth for both cases is presented in a closed form. However, the assump-
tions required by a Markov model are not realistic for real systems. A more general
approach to covert channel analysis is to treat these channels as legitimate communi-
cation channels and apply the results from information theory (i.e., Shannon’s notion
of channel capacity [54]). This idea was ﬁrst used by Millen [55] which inspired the
more rigorous analysis presented later [9,17,56–59]. In the covert channel analysis
guide published by the National Computer Security Center (NCSC), the analysis by
Tsai et al [53] (the Markov model) and by Millen [55] (the maximum information
rate) are compared. Although they found the results comparable, the guide favors
Millen’s analysis because it deﬁnes a more realistic scenario of covert channel use [5].
In information theory, the capacity of a channel is deﬁned as the maximum in-
formation rate. For noiseless channels, capacity C can be deﬁned as (using a similar
notation as in [55]),
C = lim
n→∞(
log(N(t))
t
) (2.1)
where N(t) is the number of possible messages that take t time. Millen [55] uses this
deﬁnition to calculate the capacity of noiseless channels using ﬁnite-state diagrams.
Later, Moskowitz et al [56] prove a theorem that provides a solution to this asymptotic
deﬁnition of capacity for simple timing channels in general. As illustrated in that26
paper, another way to deﬁne capacity is through mutual information.L e tX and Y
be two random variables representing the channel’s input and output characteristics,
respectively. The amount of mutual information shared between the parties is denoted
by I(X,Y ). For noisy channels, I can be calculated in terms of entropy as follows,
I(X,Y)=H(X) − H(X|Y ) (2.2)
where H(.) denotes the entropy and H(.|.) denotes the conditional entropy, or equiv-
ocation. The sender and receiver are said to be non-interfering if I(X,Y)=0 .
Moreover, if the channel is noiseless, then I(X,Y)=I(X). For timing channels, the
mutual information per tick (a tick is a unit measure of time) is given by,
It =
I(X,Y)
E(T)
(2.3)
where E(T) is the expected value of time for a symbol to be transmitted. For storage
channels, E(T) is the timing interval τ. For noiseless channels as in [55] and [56],
It =
I(X)
E(T)
(2.4)
Finally, the capacity of the channel is simply the maximum value of It, maximized
over the distributions of X,
C = max(It) (2.5)
The asymptotic and mutual information analysis of noiseless channel capacity are
equivalent. However, only mutual information analysis is easily extendable to noisy
channels. Costich et al [57] use mutual information to calculate the capacity of a
noisy storage channel that exists in the two-phase commit protocol used in MLS
transaction-based database systems (see [60]). In this channel, the HIGH sender27
passes information to the LOW receiver by either aborting (to send a zero)o rc o m -
mitting (to send a one). The channel is a noisy channel, because the other parties
can participate in the commit or abort decision and can aﬀect the output observed
by the receiver3. In this channel, if the sender inputs a zero, the output is zero inde-
pendent of other users’ inputs. In contrast, if the input is a one, there is a certain
probability for the receiver process to observe a one. The resulting communication
channel is called a Z-Channel. A Z-channel is a type of noisy communication channel,
in which one of the symbols is transmitted perfectly because it is independent of the
noise (e.g., the zero symbol in the two-phase commit protocol) [61]. The capacity of
this particular Z-channel is then calculated using the equations (2.2), (2.3), and (2.5)
from above. Detailed analysis of Z-channels can be found in [62].
Son et al [59] further analyze covert channels in MLS database systems by applying
the mutual information principles from above to calculate the covert channel capacity
in secure two-phase locking in database systems, with the added requirement of real-
time processing. Mutual information is also used to calculate the capacity of noisy
timing channels [9,58]. The major assumption in these analysis is that whenever there
is a contention for resources, the output signal is modeled to arrive exponentially
distributed with parameter λ. The capacity is then expressed using λ and p,w h e r ep
is the probability of the user sending a zero.
Shannon’s techniques for calculating capacity works only for ﬁnite-state commu-
nication channels [54]. Inﬁnite-state covert channels cannot be analyzed using the
information theoretic results from above. Shieh [63] presents examples of storage
channels that belong to this category, and proposes an encoding technique by which
they can determine the capacity of inﬁnite-state channels.
Covert channel guidelines often give a threshold for acceptable covert communi-
cation (e.g., 100 bits per second in the NCSC guideline [5]). However, this threshold
really depends on the system under question (e.g., depending on the importance of
3A transaction is committed if all of the participating parties commit individually. It is aborted if
at least one party aborts or timeouts.28
the data [63]). Moreover, capacity is not the only measure that can be used to identify
the importance of the channel. Indeed, because capacity is an asymptotic measure, it
may be misleading. For example, Moskowitz et al [17] illustrate that a zero-capacity
covert channel can be used to send a short but important message. To deal with
these types of channels, the authors introduce small message criterion (SMC), which
can be used in conjunction with channel capacity. SMC focuses on short messages
and gives guidelines for what level of covert transmission will be tolerated.
In this dissertation, our goal is not to provide a full analysis of channel capacity
but to evaluate the eﬃcacy of the IP covert channels we introduce. That is, we would
like to know how much information Alice can leak to Eve under the given channel
setup and how we can improve on this by improving the channel design. Therefore,
we do not employ the capacity analysis techniques presented above but provide simple
bandwidth analysis for our IP covert channels.
2.2.4 Elimination and Limiting
The next step is to eliminate or rate-limit high-capacity covert channels. In-
tuitively, covert channel capacity can be limited by adjusting the parameters that
appear in the capacity formula. For example, in the two-phase commit channel, the
capacity is inversely proportional to the number of other participants (n)a n dt h e
probability of aborting (p) [57]. Therefore, the capacity can be reduced by increasing
the value of either parameter. Similarly, parameter adjustments can be done in other
covert channels analyzed above. However, most of these adjustments work against
the system performance. For example, Moskowitz et al [17] argue that adjusting n
and p to limit the two-phase commit channel substantially degrades the overall sys-
tem performance. They conjecture that eliminating covert channels in high-assurance
systems is not easy and thus more sophisticated elimination schemes are needed.
Diﬀerent approaches for limiting covert channels are illustrated. One possible
way is to introduce contention noise into the channel and separate the sender and29
receiver’s system clock. Hu [8] describes one such approach using fuzzy time.I n
this scheme, random interrupts generate random clock shifts to disrupt the system
clock in diﬀerent security levels. As a result, the sender and receiver of the covert
channel no longer share a reference clock; Hence, they cannot establish a channel
using the system clock as the shared resource. Trostle [64] improve this scheme by
further separating the processes with diﬀerent security levels. Gray [65,66] analyzes
the channel capacity with fuzzy time using the standard deﬁnition of discrete memo-
ryless channels. Further, Gray [28] presents another technique called the probabilistic
partitioning for limiting covert timing channels. This technique allows processes to
share accurate reference clocks and can be used to close the bus-contention channel
completely. In this scheme, the bus controller program randomly switches between
the secure mode (in which the bus is partitioned between diﬀerent security levels)
and the insecure mode (in which covert channels can exist). Lastly, Giles et al [11]
discuss the use of jamming devices to disrupt the timing of the events in the system.
They additionally provide game-theoretic analysis of jammed channels to calculate
the channel capacity and the eﬃcacy of the jammer.
Another way to rate-limit covert channels but still assure a certain level of system
performance is to use a data pump. A data pump, also called the NRL pump, is a
store-and-forward buﬀer that controls the data exchange between diﬀerent security
levels [67,68]. The pump 1) stores a message sent by the LOW process, 2) ACKs
the LOW process upon the receipt of the message, 3) forwards the message to the
HIGH process, and 4) waits for the ACK response from the HIGH process. If the
HIGH process’ ACK rate is slower than LOW’s message input rate, a covert channel
can be established using the data pump as follows: The LOW process ﬁrst sends
back-to-back messages to the pump until it no longer receives ACK messages. The
LOW process thus blocks the pump. To send a one, HIGH removes one of the queued
messages from the pump. To send a zero, it stays idle. The LOW process constantly
monitors a timing interval τ. If it receives an ACK during this time, it records a one.
Otherwise, it records a zero. This channel does not exist if HIGH’s ACK rate is faster30
than LOW’s message input rate because in this scenario, LOW cannot ﬁll the buﬀer to
create the channel. The solution to the above covert channel is to add probabilistic
delay to slow down LOW and reduce LOW’s message rate down to HIGH’s ACK
rate [67–69]. Montrose et al [70] present an implementation of the data pump called
the event driven pump. In [12,71], a network version of the NRL pump is introduced.
Diﬀerent from the basic pump, the network pump serves multiple network users and
provides additional features. One such feature is fairness which is a scheme used to
provide fair load cuts when some of the network load needs to be cut by the pump
because of system limitations.
In this dissertation, we illustrate that the type of channels we introduce can
potentially survive channel elimination schemes such as jammers [11] and network
pumps [12] with lowered data rates. We then discuss two types of transformations on
packet inter-arrival times to increase the eﬃcacy of these elimination schemes.
Finally, an eﬀective way to eliminate most TCP/IP covert shells (i.e., information
hiding channels that use packet headers) is through traﬃc normalizers [72,73], which
modify both incoming and outgoing packets by standardizing ﬁelds that are unused,
redundant, or optional. Because covert shells are diﬀerent schemes than the covert
channels we present in this dissertation, these techniques do not apply to our IP
covert channels (i.e., our channels do not use packet headers or payload to transmit
information).
2.2.5 Auditing and Detection
Auditing and detecting covert channels have received less attention compared to
other covert channel handling techniques. Both methods are common practices in
secure systems to monitor malicious activity [14] and applicable to covert channels
for three reasons:
1. Both methods provide a mechanism to discourage the use of these channels and
may work as a deterrent [5].31
2. Most identiﬁcation systems need input from system analysts (i.e., to specify the
shared resources). Because of human error, a number of covert channels may
remain undetected. Auditing and detection can help record the activity of these
channels.
3. Covert channel elimination can be costly for high performance systems [17].
In this case, allowing these channels to exist but monitoring their activity is
crucial.
Additionally, both auditing and detection can co-exist with channel elimination
and limiting methods. In this context, auditing and detection can be used to identify
the users participating in a covert channel.
Auditing is a required activity for secure systems. However, it has been shown
that the audit practices described in the TCSEC requirements [4] are not suﬃcient
for covert storage channel auditing [74]. The problems with the TCSEC auditing
schemes are:
1. Determination of the shared resource in covert channel use.
2. Distinguishing covert channel senders and receivers.
3. Determination of whether a primitive alters or views the shared resource.
4. Circumvention of covert channel audit.
Sheih et al [74] discuss that these problems occur because 1) both view and alter
operations are allowed for the primitives, 2) a primitive can access many shared
resources used by many covert channels, and 3) many primitives can access the same
shared resource used by one covert channel. They propose an audit scheme that
identiﬁes the shared resource for each covert channel and employs audit vectors to
unambiguously record who alters/views which shared resource in what order. Once
a trace of a covert channel is identiﬁed, its bandwidth can be determined. However,32
the actual information leaked through this channel may not be recovered (i.e., the
sender can encrypt the message [74]).
Detection of covert channels is a closely related problem. The detection problem
can be classiﬁed as online and oﬄine detection. Online methods focus on the speed
of the detection algorithm to implement real-time on-the-ﬂy detection schemes. In
contrast, oﬄine detection mechanisms can be run as a batch process. Online detectors
use little data for fast detection, whereas oﬄine detectors perform more complex data
analysis using as much data as needed. Both online and oﬄine schemes rely on the
quality of the data logs generated by the above audit schemes.
Unusual traﬃc patterns may lead to discovery of storage covert shells. For exam-
ple, multiple ping requests within a small time interval may indicate a storage shell
in the ICMP protocol such as that used by Loki [34]. In addition, storage shells can
sometimes be detected by observing variations in unused packet header ﬁelds [73].
Sohn et al [75,76] illustrate an oﬄine detection scheme that uses support vector ma-
chines (SVM) to detect ICMP (payload) and TCP/IP header (IP ID and TCP ISN)
covert shells. Murdoch et al [40] argue that TCP and IP speciﬁcations exhibit suﬃ-
cient structure to deﬁne what is normal, and that learning methods such as SVM is
an overkill. They present a suite of tests to detect whether the IP ID and TCP ISN
generating processes are in compliance with the speciﬁcations.33
3. SIMPLE NETWORK COVERT CHANNELS
In this chapter, we introduce simple network channels that exploit timing of IP net-
work packets to leak information from Alice to Eve. We ﬁrst describe our implemen-
tation of an IP covert channel, both as a storage and a timing channel, and discuss the
subtle issues that arose in its design. We then report our results of channel eﬃcacy
in terms of accuracy and bandwidth in Section 3.2. In Section 3.3, we show that the
regularity of a noiseless IP simple covert channel can be used to diﬀerentiate it from
legitimate channels and present two eﬃcient online detection measures that provide
detection rates over 95%. In Section 3.4, we repeat similar analysis for noisy IP covert
channels in which legitimate and covert traﬃc are mixed in an attempt to hide the
covert channel. We show that our online detection measures fail to identify the covert
channel for noise levels higher than 10%. For such channels, we investigate eﬀective
yet computationally expensive search mechanisms that are more suitable for oﬄine
detection to locate the hidden covert channels locally for which the global measures
fail.
3.1 Covert Channel Creation
Within a distributed MLS system that properly follows policy, an observer with
a LOW security level may still be able to observe the presence of HIGH network
traﬃc without having access to the encrypted contents. Assuming that Alice is a
HIGH sender, Bob is a HIGH receiver communicating with Alice, and Eve is a LOW
observer, the only information shared between Alice and Eve is the timing of the
packets traveling from Alice to Bob. The IP simple covert channels (SCC) we present
in this chapter use this timing information to covertly transmit a secret message from
Alice to Eve by adjusting the transmission intervals of the network packets Alice sends34
to Bob. In this section, we detail the covert channel operation and implementation
for both storage and timing IP SCCs.
3.1.1 Channel Design
IP SCCs transmit a covert message from Alice to Eve bit-by-bit; hence the covert
channel symbol set is composed of zerosa n dones . T h el o n ee v e n ti nt h es y s t e mi s
packet arrival, which is controlled by Alice and observed by Eve. To send consec-
utive bits to Eve, Alice generates a sequence of packets each separated by a timing
interval (i.e., inter-arrival time). Depending on how this timing interval is chosen, a
storage or a timing channel can be devised. If Alice uses a single timing interval τ
to denote the inter-arrival times between the packets throughout the covert commu-
nication, then the resulting channel is a storage IP SCC. Alternatively, if Alice uses
a set of timing intervals τ1, τ2, ..., τn for the same purpose, the resulting channel is
a timing IP SCC. While the underlying operation is similar, we show that the latter
channel protocol is easier to implement and is more robust in the presence of timing
(i.e., synchronization) errors.
The storage IP SCC operates as follows: Alice and Eve agree a priori on a constant
timing interval (τ) and the starting protocol (either a particular time or in response
to a network event, such as the ﬁrst packet sent). To send a zero, Alice maintains
silence throughout the interval τ and does not send any packets to Bob. To send a
one, she transmits a single packet to Bob in the middle of τ. On the receiving end (of
the covert channel), Eve monitors the transmission line between Alice and Bob. She
records a zero if no packets are observed throughout the interval τ,aone otherwise.
By observing each τ consecutively, Eve records the entire binary string transmitted
over the covert channel. Figure 3.1 illustrates a running example of a storage IP SCC.
The timing IP SCC operates as follows: Alice and Eve agree on a set of timing
intervals τ1,τ 2,...,τn, a set of associations for each timing interval (e.g., (τ1, zero), (τ2,
one), etc.), and the starting protocol. For simplicity, we assume that they agree on35
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Fig. 3.1. IP storage SCC. The example text is ﬁrst encoded with a
coding scheme and then sent bit by bit to the receiving end. The
message is rebuilt by decoding the bit stream.
two timing intervals τ1 and τ2 with associations (τ1, zero)a n d( τ2, one). To send a
zero, Alice sleeps for τ1 units of time and sends a packet at the end of this interval.
To send a one, she sends a packet after sleeping for τ2 units of time. On the receiving
end (of the covert channel), Eve monitors the transmission line between Alice and
Bob. Upon the observance of a network packet, Eve 1) records the inter-arrival time
τ,2 )c o m p a r e sτ to both τ1 and τ2, and 3) records a zero or one depending on the
previous comparison. Again by observing consecutive inter-arrival times, Eve records
the entire binary string transmitted over the covert channel. Figure 3.2 illustrates a
running example of a timing IP SCC. Our observations and assumptions in designing
both types of IP SCCs are:
1. Alice and Eve use a single covert channel to communicate, thus our research does
not address multiple channels that aggregate packet traﬃc to leak information.36
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Fig. 3.2. IP timing SCC. The example text is ﬁrst encoded with a
coding scheme and then sent bit by bit to the receiving end. The
message is rebuilt by decoding the bit stream.
2. Alice has a ready supply of network packets that she can send to Bob at any
given time and the channel protocol allows arbitrary sends from Alice (e.g., she
sends HTTP GET requests with arbitrary content to Bob who is a web server
with HIGH content).
3. Our research does not address the cases in which Bob might become suspicious
as a result of the amount of network traﬃc generated by Alice.
4. The original payloads of the network packets transmitted over the direct channel
between Alice and Bob are legitimate, hence do not violate any MLS policies.
Further, the covert message sent over the indirect channel is independent of the
original packet payloads.
5. The raw data that ﬂows across the covert channel is binary but the actual
interpretation of the binary string is up to Alice and Eve.37
1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0
Start of frame (SOF) –
always a “1”
Message data bits – depends on the coding scheme
Error correcting parity bits – depends 
on the error correcting scheme
Fig. 3.3. Components of an example IP SCC frame: Data, error
correcting, and synchronization bits.
6. Additional bits may also be included in the transmission for three reasons:
1) Additional parity bits may be appended to the data to add redundancy for
error correction caused by transmission errors (e.g., errors arising when a packet
is lost/delayed), 2) additional bits may be added for purposes of maintaining
synchronization between Alice and Eve’s event clocks, and 3) the covert data
may be encrypted to add a further layer of privacy and obfuscation. In our
implementation, we employ error-correcting codes but not encryption.
7. The covert message for transmission is subdivided into smaller blocks of binary
data, referred to as frames in this paper. An example frame consists of data
bits, synchronization bits, and error-correcting bits. Figure 3.3 shows a repre-
sentation of a frame. While all the frames are of equal length, the actual length,
as well as the interval between frames, is inﬂuenced by parameters of the en-
coding scheme and the network. In our implementation, frames are composed
of the eight-bit ASCII encoding of each character, a start of frame (SOF) bit
(only for storage IP SCCs as we discuss in Section 3.1.2), and an optional six38
bits for error correction using (7-4)-Hamming codes. We explain the use of the
SOF bit and detail the use of Hamming codes in Section 3.1.2.
8. We assume a unidirectional communication model for the covert channel. Only
the indirect covert channel is assumed to be unidirectional; The direct channel
itself is still bidirectional and the TCP/IP packets are ACKed. Assuming a
unidirectional channel means that Eve cannot communicate with Alice using
the covert channel itself. Restricting the channel to be unidirectional increases
the diﬃculty in implementing an error-free channel. In detail, Eve cannot 1)
acknowledge the correct receipt of covert bits, 2) rate-limit Alice, or 3) indicate
when to resynchronize.
3.1.2 Channel Implementation
We implemented our covert channels using the C Berkeley socket library for our
communication protocol, and Python version 2.3 to encode/decode the data trans-
mitted over the channel and as a wrapper that called the C library functions. The
software was developed for and ran under Red Hat Linux 9.0 kernel version 2.4.22.
For simplicity, our IP SCC prototype transmits packets from Alice to Eve directly.
This scenario apparently violates policy because such direct communication is not
allowed in an MLS system. However, we argue that the traﬃc pattern generated
by this channel is the same as the packet traﬃc that would be generated in any
scenario described in Appendix A. This is because in this channel the traﬃc pattern
is shaped by the covert message and the timing interval, not by the direction of the
communication (i.e., Alice shapes the traﬃc and Eve has no eﬀect on it). Further, we
argue that in terms of channel bandwidth, our IP SCC prototype provides an upper
limit. This is because in any other scenario in which Eve is eavesdropping, Eve can
only lose information caused by an error in the observation. Further, because the
traﬃc pattern remains the same, the detection schemes we introduce in Sections 3.3
and 3.4 that monitor the channel for anomalous traﬃc patterns will be unaﬀected.39
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Fig. 3.4. Alice’s execution ﬂow diagram for a storage IP SCC.
The channel implementation diﬀers slightly for the storage and timing IP SCCs.
The storage IP SCC software uses both blocking and non-blocking Berkeley sockets
and alternates between them to transmit a covert message to Eve. In detail, Eve
uses a blocking socket to wait for the SOF packet to arrive at the beginning of
each frame. Once this packet is observed, she switches to a non-blocking socket to
record the remaining bits of the frame and reverts back to the blocking socket to
wait for the SOF packet of the next frame. We illustrate the execution ﬂow of Alice
and Eve for a storage IP SCC in Figures 3.4 and 3.5. Given an encoded message,
Alice sends a packet in the middle of the timing interval for each one,a n ds t a y s40
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Fig. 3.5. Eve’s execution ﬂow diagram for a storage IP SCC.
silent for each zero. Before sending the data bits of a frame, Alice sends the SOF
denoting the beginning of frame. After Eve receives the SOF bit, the blocking socket
is resolved and Eve switches to non-blocking mode. During non-blocking mode, Eve’s
receiver program continues its execution and checks whether a packet arrives during
the timing interval or not. If Eve receives at least one packet during the interval, a
one is recorded. Otherwise a zero is recorded and Eve advances to the next interval41
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Fig. 3.6. Alice’s execution ﬂow diagram for a timing IP SCC.
until the necessary number of bits for a frame is received. Once a frame is completed,
Eve switches back to the blocking mode and listens for the next SOF. Because the
blocking socket pauses and waits for SOF in between two frames, this implementation
provides an inherent synchronization. However, this scheme itself does not entirely
solve the synchronization problem because of network congestion and jitter, and we
discuss various other solutions for synchronization problems in Section 3.2.1.
In contrast, the timing IP SCC software is much simpler. The main diﬀerence
from the storage channel is that in timing channels, the events (i.e., packet arrivals)
are tied to the symbols (i.e., the bits), whereas in storage channels the events are
tied to intervals. An advantage of this scheme is that we no longer need non-blocking
sockets to wait for the silent intervals because each event is explicitly signaled by
a packet arrival. Therefore, timing IP SCCs use a single blocking socket to record
the packet arrival times and do not employ an SOF bit. The latter is because the
implementation of timing IP SCCs is more straightforward and is less prone to timing42
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Fig. 3.7. Eve’s execution ﬂow diagram for a timing IP SCC.
(i.e., synchronization) errors as we discuss in Section 3.2.1. We illustrate the execution
ﬂow of Alice and Eve for a timing IP SCC in Figures 3.6 and 3.7.
Both IP SCCs can be conﬁgured to run on any application port. Because the
traﬃc pattern is expected to vary based on the application, choice of the protocol
in which to hide the channels can aﬀect detection ability. For example, as we show
experimentally in Section 3.3.2, UDP traﬃc generates patterns almost as regular as
covert channel traﬃc caused by its best-eﬀort nature. Therefore, running the covert
channel software on a UDP port will hide the channel better than running it, for
example, on the Telnet port.43
3.2 Covert Channel Analysis
We assess the eﬃcacy of IP SCCs in terms of bit/character accuracy (the number of
bits/characters transmitted correctly divided by the total number of bits/characters)
and channel bandwidth. Two factors aﬀect channel accuracy and bandwidth:
1. Contention noise is the amount of non-covert traﬃc Eve observes in the covert
channel and can potentially reduce channel accuracy [9].
2. Clock skew is the amount of jitter in the network and can potentially result in
the loss of synchronization between Alice’s and Eve’s event clocks.
In this section, we investigate the eﬀects of these factors on channel accuracy and
bandwidth, and present the results of our empirical study with diﬀerent choices of
timing intervals.
3.2.1 Channel Accuracy
To evaluate the channel eﬃcacy alone and provide an upper bound on character
accuracy, we investigate noiseless IP SCCs. We assume that IP SCCs are free of
contention noise, hence Eve is capable of isolating the network packets generated by
Alice and destined to Bob from the ones originating from or destined to other users
in the network. In this scenario, clock skew is the only factor that aﬀects channel
accuracy. IP SCCs leak information using the timings of packets generated by Alice
and observed by Eve. In distributed systems, there may be a delay between the time
a packet is generated and it is observed. If the delay is constant, Eve can simply
adjust the packet clock to compensate for this delay. However if the delay is varying,
that is the time that a packet travels from Alice to Eve jitters, the inter-arrival times
observed by Eve are no longer exactly the same as the ones generated by Alice. This
eﬀect is called clock skew. Clock skew in a network is mostly caused by varying
network conditions that result in slight increase or decreases in the latency between44
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Fig. 3.8. A zero-insertion and a zero-deletion example for a storage IP SCC.
Alice and Eve (also known as network jitter). This can potentially aﬀect the timing of
network packets traveling from Alice to Bob (Eve) and thus reduce channel eﬃcacy.
Channel Synchronization
An important problem for IP SCCs related to clock skew is the synchronization
of Alice and Eve’s packet clocks. For example clock skew can cause Eve to record
packets as arriving in a time interval before or after the intended one. For a storage
IP SCC, this skew can result in an individual bit ﬂip, a zero-insertion, or a zero-
deletion as we illustrate in Figure 3.8. The individual bit-ﬂips can be corrected using
error-correcting codes; however, insertion and deletion errors can potentially cause
an entire series of transmission to be shifted. One-insertions and one-deletions are
not possible for IP SCCs. Further, insertion and deletion errors only apply to storage
IP SCCs. This is because in timing IP SCCs, each network packet has a one-to-
one correspondence with a single bit of information, whereas in a storage IP SCC a
packet delay can cause additional zeros to be inserted. Therefore, in timing IP SCCs
bit errors are independent from each other and are not carried to the next bit as in45
the storage case, in which an insertion can potentially shift the entire bit-string. This
advantage over the storage IP channels makes the timing channel more suitable for
one-bit error-correction which we discuss next.
One way to remedy clock skew is to use error-correcting codes (ECC) to correct
the individual bit errors. ECCs add additional bits to the message that can be
used to detect and correct some errors in transmission [77, 78]. The code rate of
an ECC is deﬁned as the ratio between the length of an original message word and
the length of its codeword. A drawback of ECCs is that they increase the number
of bits to be transmitted. In our study, we employed Hamming codes,w h i c ha r e
computationally simple to encode and decode and are capable of correcting one error
per codeword [78]. To increase accuracy, one could also employ more sophisticated
ECCs such as the Reed-Solomon codes or turbo codes [77]. Another scheme one could
also use for storage channels would be to employ coding schemes that take advantage
of the lack of one-insertions and one-deletions.
An additional scheme we employed to prevent synchronization errors for storage
IP SCCs is to use an SOF bit at the beginning of each frame and to switch to a
blocking socket every time a frame is completely transmitted. This scheme isolates
transmission errors within individual frames and stop the propagation of errors to the
following frames by aligning Alice and Eve’s timing windows each time an SOF bit is
transmitted.
We enhanced the SOF scheme by introducing silent intervals between frames.
During a silent interval, no packet transfer occurs between Alice and Eve, thus the
channel recovers from the errors that occurred before this period. We assume that
the parties have previously determined the length of the silent interval. This interval
can either be a default value or the covert channel itself can be initially used to send
this value before the actual data transfer starts. Alice can enter the silent state at
any time during the transmission. However, she has no way of knowing whether Eve
received the covert bits correctly or not (i.e., the covert channel is unidirectional).
Therefore, it is up to Alice to observe the changing network conditions and make the46
decision about when to pause the transmission. As an example, a sudden change
in the round-trip time (RTT) between Alice and Eve might be a good signal that
Alice should enter the silent state. On the receiving end, Eve simply waits for the
arrival of the SOF packet (i.e., the ﬁrst packet that arrives after a string of possibly
erroneous zeros) and takes no action. A simpler option is to enter the silent state
periodically to clear the channel. This method increases channel accuracy at the
expense of transmission rate.
Rather than slow down the transmission by introducing silent periods in which
no transfer occurs, the channel could adapt to the changes gradually as the network
conditions change. In our interval adjusting scheme, Eve closely monitors the time
each packet arrives and compares it to the projected ideal case (i.e., the expected
arrival time of the next packet) based on the current timing interval. Comparing the
two, a δ is computed, which is the deviation between the ideal and actual times and
can be positive or negative depending on whether the packet has arrived early or late.
Eve then simply adds this value to the timing interval and adjusts the clock for the
next arriving packet. This scheme is most useful when there is an incremental change
in the network conditions that persists for longer than the lifetime of a single packet.
It can however lead to errors if the change in the network delay is greater than 50%
of the timing interval (e.g., adjust to an incorrect timing interval). As a precaution,
we restrict the maximum adjustment to be less than 10% between two consecutive
intervals.
More advanced solutions for combating synchronization errors caused by clock
skew are self-synchronizing codes and phase-locked loops (PLL). The former method
employs encoding schemes that are speciﬁcally designed to detect the loss of synchro-
nization and to recover from this state (i.e., resynchronization). The latter method
is a closed-loop feedback circuit that is designed to track or synchronize an output
signal with an input signal in frequency and phase [79]. Both methods were proved
to be eﬀective in communications and could be applied to our channels to achieve
better accuracy.47
3.2.2 Channel Bandwidth
Ideally, using the shortest timing intervals possible yields the highest data rate.
However, this rate is limited by three factors:
1. Alice’s packet generator is the bottleneck as she cannot generate packets at a
higher rate than the generator’s rate. Another limiting factor on Alice’s side
is the precision of the packet delayer. As we use shorter timing intervals, the
delayer routine may fail to sleep precisely for the required amount of time. The
same constraints also apply to Eve’s observer routine.
2. In networks with jitter, the negative impact of clock skew on channel accuracy
increases as we use shorter timing intervals. This is because with short timing
intervals a small variation on the interval may alter its symbol association (i.e.,
place it in a diﬀerent partition) whereas the same variation may be negligible
for long intervals.
3. Timing intervals that yield high data rates may be anomalous in comparison to
normal traﬃc in the network.
3.2.3 Empirical Evaluation
To assess the eﬃcacy of the covert channel experimentally, we used our implemen-
tation of a storage IP SCC. Our covert channel ran between Purdue and Georgetown
university networks and was subject to changing network conditions. During nor-
mal network conditions, the route between communicating parties was twelve hops
with an average RTT of 31.5 msec. For one-bit error-correction, we used Hamming
codes that are computationally simple to encode and decode [78]. To calculate bit
and character accuracy we used an implementation of the Levenshtein distance (i.e.,
the edit distance [80]). IP SCCs are capable of sending both binary and text data
and we used ASCII encoding for the latter. In both cases, the software divided the48
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Fig. 3.9. Timing interval versus accuracy with diﬀerent values of k
for the silent interval synchronization scheme.
resulting bit-string into eight-bit codewords that were expanded to 14 bits when we
used (7,4)-Hamming error-correction.
Eﬀect of timing interval size
We ﬁrst investigated the potential data rate of our channel by decreasing the
timing interval until the accuracy drops. We mark this point as a threshold that can
be thought as a boundary between lossless and lossy communication and calculate
the corresponding channel bit and character rate. In this experiment, we employed
a storage IP SCC channel with the periodic silent intervals synchronization scheme
described in Section 3.2.1, with k denoting the frequency the synchronization scheme
goes into a silent period (e.g., every twenty timing intervals). The character coding is49
eight bit ASCII with no error correction. We report the trade-oﬀ between the timing
interval and the channel accuracy in Figure 3.9. Our channel provided nearly lossless
communication for larger intervals at the cost of lower transmission bandwidth.
The results show that the threshold value for the timing interval is around 0.06
seconds and intervals greater than 0.06 guarantee nearly 98% character accuracy for
all three values of k. The equivalent bit transfer rate is 16.666 bits per second (bps).
With ASCII encoding and the SOF bit taken into account, we calculate the character
transfer rate 2.083 characters per second. As expected, the channel accuracy remains
high for larger timing intervals. It also remains slightly higher when the transmissions
are periodically paused for resynchronization.
Eﬀect of network conditions
We additionally investigated a case with network congestion and its eﬀects on the
performance of the covert channel. To do so, we ran our covert channel on a congested
network with a highly varying RTT between Alice and Eve with mean RTT at 42.07
msec. The normal RTT values for this channel showed a steady behavior with mean
RTT at 31.5 msec. Our evaluations showed that the congestion results in a lower
accuracy rate. For example, with the timing interval set to 0.08, we observed 100%
average character accuracy under normal conditions, but the accuracy dropped to
82.11% for the congested network. Clearly, the interval must be increased to retain
accuracy during periods of high congestion.
3.2.4 Storage or Timing?
In designing IP SCCs, we investigated storage and timing channels separately and
noted subtle diﬀerences between them. Despite these diﬀerences, storage and timing
IP SCCs are related constructs and, for example, given a storage channel, one can
provide a reduction to show that an equivalent timing channel can be constructed
and vice versa. To see this, consider a timing IP SCC with a single state (response)50
packet observed and timing intervals τ1 and τ2. Using this channel, we can construct
a storage IP SCC with states packet present and packet absent (both derived from
the single state packet arrival), and τ = τ1 +τ2. Similarly, given a storage IP SCC
with timing interval τ, we can construct a timing IP SCC with τ1 = τ and τ2 =2 τ.
Additionally, we claim that if we can detect a storage IP SCC that transmits a bit-
string over the network, we can detect the timing equivalent of the same channel. As
we present in the next two sections, our detection methods use measures that capture
the regularity of packet inter-arrival times generated by these channels. Consider a
storage IP SCC with timing interval τ that generates k diﬀerent inter-arrival time
values, where k is equal to the number of diﬀerent number of zerosw ec a nh a v e
between two ones in a codeword (e.g., for the set {11, 101, 1001}, k = 3). In contrast,
the timing equivalent of this IP SCC uses two timing intervals τ1 and τ2 that generates
only two clusters of inter-arrival times, thus generating a more regular inter-arrival
time pattern. Therefore, we concentrate only on storage IP SCCs in covert channel
detection and conjecture that detection measures that work for these channels would
also work for timing IP SCCs.
3.3 Noiseless Channel Detection
For a storage IP SCC, there must be a pre-speciﬁed timing interval between con-
secutive network packets sent by Alice and observed by Eve. Similarly for a timing
IP SCC, there must be pre-speciﬁed timing intervals. This behavior implies regular-
ity in terms of packet inter-arrival times in comparison to packet inter-arrival times
generated by a legitimate process and we argue that the packet traﬃc generated by
IP SCCs is highly regular (thus anomalous) in comparison to the traﬃc generated by
legitimate processes (e.g., as compared to WWW traﬃc). To show an example, we
plot the inter-arrival times generated by both channels while sending a sample text1
from Alice to Bob (Eve) in Figure 3.10. For the storage IP SCC, we observe that the
1“All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason
and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.[EOL]” [81]51
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Fig. 3.10. Inter-arrival times for diﬀerent traﬃc types. (a) A sim-
ulated IP storage SCC with τ =0 .2 secs (no clock skew). (b) A
simulated IP timing SCC with τ1 =0 .1 secs and τ2 =0 .2s e c( n o
clock skew). (c) An example NZIX-II WWW traﬃc.
packet inter-arrival times can be grouped into six clusters. Similarly, the inter-arrival
times for the timing IP SCC can be grouped into two clusters. Figure 3.10(c) shows
that no such clustering is obvious for a sample WWW traﬃc taken from the NZIX-II
dataset [10].
To identify this type of a covert channel requires being able to capture such reg-
ularity. In this section, we introduce two measures to do so and empirically evaluate
the eﬃcacy of both in terms of Type I (false positive (FP)) and Type II (false negative
(FN)) error rates.52
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Fig. 3.11. Inter-arrival times from an actual run of a storage IP SCC
with τ =0 .04 secs. (a) Actual values. (b) Sorted values. (c) Relative
diﬀerences.
3.3.1 Measures for Detection
To capture the type of regularity we described above, we introduce two detection
measures:  -similarity and compressibility.
 -Similarity
To derive our ﬁrst similarity measure, we sort the inter-arrival times we collected
using IP SCCs. From this sorted list we compute the relative diﬀerence between each
pair of consecutive points. For example, the relative diﬀerence between Pi and Pi+1
is computed as
Pi+1−Pi
Pi . We illustrate this process in Figure 3.11 for a compilation
of inter-arrival times we collected using our implementation of a storage IP SCC
we ran between Purdue and Georgetown universities. As a result of network jitter53
that created clock skew, the inter-arrival times no longer create perfect clusters as
in Figure 3.10. From the sorted inter-arrival times we compute an eﬃcient measure
of similarity, which we call  -similarity, by computing the percentage of relative dif-
ferences that are less than a constant number  . Our claim is that for noiseless IP
SCCs, the majority of the pairwise diﬀerences in the sorted inter-arrival time list will
be small. (It is large only for jumps in the step function.) Thus, the similarity scores
for IP SCCs will be high. We further claim that the IP SCC  -similarity scores will
be comparably higher than that of legitimate channel scores.
Compressibility
The Kolmogorov complexity of a string S is deﬁned as the shortest universal
computer program that produces this string (see [82]). Denoted as K(S), this notion
provides a lower bound on the representation of the string and computes the maximum
available compression on S, hence producing the shortest possible compressed string
C. For an arbitrary string S, Kolmogorov complexity is not a computable [82];
however, oﬀ-the-shelf compression algorithms can be used as an approximation [83].
To derive our second similarity measure, let S ∈ Σs be a string we want to
compress with any oﬀ-the-shelf compressor, where Σ is the alphabet of symbols from
which the string is drawn, and s is the length of S. Let the resulting compressed
string be C ∈ Σc. We deﬁne the compressibility of S as the compression rate we
obtain by dividing the length of S by the length of C. Formally,
∀S ∈ Σs,∃C ∈ Σc such that
C =  (S), and κ(S)=
|S|
|C|
where   is the compressor (e.g., gzip), κ(S) is the compressibility of S,a n d|.| is
the length operator. Our claim is that the compressibility of the inter-arrival packet
times generated by a noiseless IP SCC will be higher than the ones generated by
legitimate channels. Inter-arrival times are numerical values whereas compression54
works on strings. In Section 3.3.2, we detail how we convert these numbers to strings
as a pre-processing step to compression.
A Discussion of Other Approaches
We additionally investigated several approaches that were not fruitful, but were
more obvious from a statistical point of view.
Indexes of dispersion of a point process have been used as a tool in network
characterization [84,85]. An index of dispersion for intervals (IDI) c a nb eu s e dt o
qualitatively compare the inter-arrival times of a point process with the Poisson pro-
cess serving as the basis (for which the IDI is unity) [86]. IDI provides a ﬁner measure
for deﬁning the variability of the process than does a second order moment analysis.
Gusella deﬁnes the variability, or the burstiness, of the network traﬃc as “the changes
in the variance of the sum of consecutive inter-arrivals” [84]. Although this measure
appears promising, it requires a number of assumptions including stationarity,t h a t
need to be made for the correct interpretation of the results. In this study, we do not
impose such assumptions on the distributions of covert or legitimate traﬃc.
Another avenue we examined was statistical non-parametric tests similar to those
used in network traﬃc analysis [87–89]. Applications of these tests have mainly
concentrated on network traﬃc characterization and modeling. The goal is often
to determine whether two streams come from the same empirical distribution, for
example, using a non-parametric goodness-of-ﬁt test such as the Kolmogorov-Smirnov
test. In our research, we are not seeking to model either the legitimate or the covert
network traﬃc. Our goal is to deﬁne measures that diﬀerentiate covert from legitimate
traﬃc, therefore, these methods are not directly applicable to the detection of IP
SCCs.55
3.3.2 Empirical Evaluation
In this section, we empirically show that both  -similarity and compressibility
measures are able to detect IP SCCs, and that compressibility performs better than  -
similarity. In our experiments, we applied these measures on both legitimate channels
and IP SCCs. Our legitimate traces were extracted from the second version of NZIX
datasets (NZIX-II) which is a collection of TCP (WWW, FTP-Data, and SSH) and
UDP traces collected by the WAND research group [10]. We used twenty diﬀerent
traces for each legitimate traﬃc type and each trace contained a suﬃcient number of
packets that we could run the covert channel over it without running out of packets.
To collect the inter-arrival times for the covert channel, we ran three storage IP SCCs
(with τ set to 0.04, 0.06, and 0.08 secs) that transmitted the sample text between
Purdue and Georgetown universities.
For each trace, we ﬁrst eliminated values larger than one second to eliminate large
inter-arrival time values from the data that occur when there is no packet transfer.
This allows us to deal only with short values and therefore concentrate on the network
eﬀects on the inter-arrival times rather than the user eﬀects (e.g., time gaps between
the HTTP requests). Our goal is not to model or identify a traﬃc distribution, but
to determine whether we can accurately detect a covert channel in a short window
(i.e., for on-line detection). Therefore, in our experiments we report the results for
windows of size 2000. Although we ran the IP SCC on a real network between Purdue
and Georgetown, for the legitimate traﬃc we used the recorded inter-arrival times in
the datasets. A drawback is that we cannot have the same network conditions (e.g.,
number of hops, same jitter), but excluding the case of jitter, this does not impact
our results. This is because none of our measures look at absolute inter-arrival time
values, but rather compute measures of regularity in terms of the relative diﬀerences
between these values.56
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Fig. 3.12.  -similarity scores for various types of covert and legitimate channels.
 -Similarity Results
We report the results for our ﬁrst measure in Figure 3.12 and Table 3.1. The
x-axis shows seven diﬀerent arbitrarily chosen   values and the y-axis shows the
mean  -similarity score (averaged over twenty traces of each traﬃc type), that is the
percentage of all pairs of sorted inter-arrival time values whose diﬀerence is less than
 . As anticipated, the results show a striking diﬀerence between the IP SCC and
NZIX-II scores. For example, the 0.005-similarity score for the IP SCC with τ =0 .06
is 52 while it is 21 for FTP-Data. Thus, on average 52% of the sorted IP SCC inter-
arrival times relatively diﬀer less than   =0 .005 while only 21% of FTP-Data diﬀer
less than the same  . Another result we observe in Table 3.1 is that the higher τ
we use for the storage channel (i.e., to get better accuracy), the higher the similarity
scores. This implies that more accurate channels are easier to distinguish from normal
traﬃc, hence they are easier to detect.57
Table 3.1
 -similarity scores for storage IP SCCs for various τ.
τ 0.005 0.008 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.1
0.04 39.97 52.88 58.63 72.84 79.84 91.90
0.06 52.08 63.28 69.68 80.74 86.24 95.60
0.08 64.88 75.19 78.54 87.89 91.55 97.50
Compressibility Results
Before applying the compressibility measure, we needed to convert our numerical
dataset into a set of strings because compression works on strings. To do so, we
ﬁrst smoothed each dataset by taking two signiﬁcant digits (and rounding the third
digit), and added a letter at the beginning depending on the number of zeros after
the decimal point. For example, we transformed 0.00247 to B25, and 0.0247 to A25,
etc. This way, we could still identify the same values without using repeating zeros,
which would create more compressible datasets2.
After this added pre-processing phase, we performed our experiments using gzip
as the compressor [90]. We report the mean compressibility score for each traﬃc type
in Figure 3.13 averaged over twenty traces for the legitimate channels. Our results
show that the compressibility scores for the SSH, WWW, and FTP-Data datasets
are much lower than IP SCC compressibility scores. For example, the compressibility
score for the storage IP SCC with τ =0 .06 is 6.76 while it is 3.27 for WWW on
average. In addition, we observe that as we increase the timing interval for IP SCC,
it becomes more compressible. For example, the compressibility score for a 0.04 IP
SCC is 5.76, whereas it is 7.01 for 0.08. We conjecture that the more accurate the
covert channel, the more compressible its dataset.
2Even though B25 and A25 compress better than B25 and B31, this eﬀect is evenly distributed
among all datasets, whereas repeating zeros favor datasets with data points with small magnitudes.58
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Fig. 3.13. Compressibility scores for various types of covert and legitimate channels.
Automatic Detection
To assess the eﬃcacy of channel detection experimentally, we evaluated the eﬃcacy
of both measures in terms of FN and FP rates. Our procedure worked as follows: For
each legitimate traﬃc type (WWW, FTP-Data, and UDP3), we randomly chose ten
traces out of twenty for training. We reserved the remaining ten independent traces
for testing. In the training phase, we calculated the  -similarity or compressibility
scores for each training trace and computed the mean μ and the standard deviation
σ to determine our thresholds μ +1 .5σ and μ +2 σ. The main diﬀerence between
 -similarity and compressibility was that in the former we calculated seven diﬀerent
learned thresholds for each of seven   values (0.005, 0.008, 0.01, 0.02, 0.03, 0.1, and <
0.1) that were chosen arbitrarily. For compressibility we calculated only one threshold.
To classify a test trace as legitimate or covert, we calculated its  -similarity (for
each   value) or compressibility score that we compared to the learned threshold. A
dataset was classiﬁed as covert if its combined score was above the learned threshold
and legitimate otherwise. For  -similarity, the combined score was determined by
3We omit the SSH results because NZIX-II did not contain enough SSH traces for training and
testing.59
Table 3.2
IP SCC detection eﬃcacy for  -similarity and compressibility with
thresholds μ +1 .5σ and μ +2 σ.
Threshold Application fp fn(0.04) fn(0.06) fn(0.08)
 -similarity
μ +1 .5σ www 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00
ftp-data 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00
udp 0.14 0.65 0.19 0.00
μ +2 σ www 0.04 0.08 0.00 0.00
ftp-data 0.00 0.28 0.00 0.00
udp 0.08 0.90 0.66 0.38
Compressibility
μ +1 .5σ www 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.00
ftp-data 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00
udp 0.12 0.19 0.00 0.00
μ +2 σ www 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00
ftp-data 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00
udp 0.09 0.63 0.02 0.00
taking the majority vote over seven diﬀerent   values. For example, we classiﬁed the
trace as covert if the scores for four out of seven   values were over the threshold. For
compressibility, the combined score was simply the compressibility score.
In our results, we report the averages of 100 runs of the above procedure. Each run
used a diﬀerent partition of the twenty legitimate traces into training and testing. We
report the average FP and FN rates for the  -similarity and compressibility measures
in Table 3.2. We list our observations and conclusions as follows:
1. The results suggest that we can distinguish IP SCC traces from WWW and
FTP-Data traces (i.e., FN = 0%) with low false alarm rates using both  -60
similarity and compressibility measures with thresholds μ +1 .5σ and μ +2 σ
respectively.
2. UDP results with high FN rates suggest that we cannot distinguish IP SCC
traces from UDP traces with a reasonable false alarm rate. UDP is a best-eﬀort
protocol in which the packets are sent as soon as they are ready (i.e, there is no
ﬂow control). Therefore, UDP inter-arrival times tend to be regular under stable
network conditions, and thus generate higher  -similarity and compressibility
scores as compared to TCP inter-arrival times.
3. The compressibility measure fares better than the  -similarity measure in terms
of the FN rates with comparable FP rates. Further, compressibility uses only
one measurement whereas  -similarity requires a majority vote over seven mea-
surements. Therefore, we conjecture that compressibility is a superior measure.
4. As claimed before, IP SCCs with higher τ yield higher detection rates. This
is because using higher timing intervals yields more accurate channels which
generate more regular inter-arrival times as a result.
5. We claim that the FP rates for both measures can potentially be lowered by
increasing the number of datasets we use in the training phase. Using only ten
datasets for training was an experimental short-coming as we were limited by
the available legitimate data. In a real detection environment, hundreds of such
traces can be used to train the classiﬁer.
3.4 Noisy Channel Detection
A noisy IP SCC is a network covert channel in which we observe both legitimate
and covert traﬃc. This channel may arise in cases where Eve cannot isolate the net-
work packets originating from Alice as a result of the shared use of the transmission
line that is being tapped. In addition, introducing noise into the channel artiﬁcially
has been shown to be eﬀective in jamming the covert channel and limiting its band-61
width [11]. In our study, we assume that Alice injects noise into the transmission line
intentionally to increase the irregularity of the packet inter-arrival times and thwart
the regularity-based detection schemes.
In this section, we ﬁrst empirically show that if channel noise reaches a certain
level, the regularity-based detection measures fail to identify the covert channel and
Alice can potentially hide the covert channel by mixing it with legitimate traﬃc.
Given this observation, we argue that to detect such hidden IP SCCs, we need more
localized measures to focus on the suspicious segments of the dataset. To do so, we
employ compression-based similarity measures accompanied with a sliding window
algorithm to search for covert channels in mix datasets. We conclude the section
with an empirical study to evaluate the eﬃcacy and performance of our methods.
3.4.1 Empirical Evaluation with Noiseless Measures
In this section, we show that regularity-based measures fail to detect noisy IP
SCCs with reasonable false alarm rates for noise levels higher than 10%. We apply the
 -similarity and compressibility measures to mix datasets that we formed by mixing
packet inter-arrival times extracted from WWW, FTP-Data, and UDP datasets with
the ones generated by IP SCCs. As an example, to create a 10% FTP-Data mix
dataset with 2000 data points, we picked 200 consecutive data points from a FTP-
Data dataset and inserted it as a block within 1800 data points we selected from the
IP SCC dataset at a randomly selected location. This scheme resembles the cases
in which we apply our measures on a larger window than the duration of the covert
communication. Actually, how we mix these data points does not matter for our
detection measures because neither measure pays attention to the relative ordering of
the individual data points. This is because both measures rearrange the data points
as a pre-processing step (e.g., the  -similarity measure sorts the data points).
In our experiments, we used the same setup and datasets as in Section 3.3. We
report the average scores for the  -similarity measure for each mix dataset with noise62
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Fig. 3.14.  -similarity scores for a noisy IP SCC with diﬀerent traﬃc
types and noise levels set at 10%, 25%, and 50%.
levels at 10%, 25%, and 50% in Figure 3.14. The  -similarity scores for the mix
datasets are comparably lower than the ones we calculated in Section 3.3. For exam-
ple, the mean 0.005-similarity score for the pure IP SCC (τ =0 .06) is 52 while a 25%
FTP-Data mix dataset generates a score of 34.
The average scores for the compressibility measure show a similar trend which we
illustrate in Figure 3.15. The compressibility scores for the mix datasets are substan-
tially lower than the ones we calculated for the pure covert channels in Section 3.3.
For example, the mean compressibility score for the pure IP SCC (τ =0 .06 secs) is
6.76 while a 25% FTP-Data mix dataset generates a score of 4.98.
To determine how automatic detection with both measures would fare in the pres-
ence of noise, we repeated the automatic detection study we presented in Section 3.3 to
compute the FN rates. We chose ten training traces out of twenty legitimate datasets
to compute the mean μ and the standard deviation σ to determine our thresholds
μ+1.5σ (for  -similarity) and μ+2σ (for compressibility). We reserved the remaining
ten independent traces for testing. We averaged the results over 100 runs each time63
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Fig. 3.15. Compressibility scores for a noisy IP SCC with diﬀerent
traﬃc types and noise levels set at 10%, 25%, and 50%.
using a diﬀerent partition of the twenty legitimate traces into training and testing.
We report the results in Table 3.3 and list our observations and conclusions as follows:
1. The results suggest that both measures can detect WWW and FTP-Data mix
datasets up to 10% noise level. We conclude that our measures work for low
noise levels.
2. Compressibility further detects WWW and FTP-Data mix datasets up to 25%
noise level for which the  -similarity measure completely fails. We conclude that
compressibility is a more robust measure when detecting noisy IP SCCs.
3. Neither measure can detect 50% mix datasets with a reasonable false alarm rate
regardless of the mix type and UDP mix datasets regardless of the noise level.64
Table 3.3
Noisy IP SCC detection eﬃcacy for  -similarity and compressibility
with thresholds μ +1 .5σ ( -similarity) and μ +2 σ (compressibility).
Application Noise fn(0.04) fn(0.06) fn(0.08)
 -similarity
www 10% 0.00 0.00 0.00
25% 0.76 0.23 0.00
50% 1.00 0.98 0.80
ftp-data 10% 0.04 0.00 0.00
25% 0.99 0.64 0.00
50% 1.00 1.00 1.00
udp 10% 0.81 0.45 0.08
25% 0.99 0.95 0.80
50% 1.00 1.00 0.99
Compressibility
www 10% 0.00 0.00 0.00
25% 0.00 0.00 0.00
50% 0.95 0.92 0.74
ftp-data 10% 0.00 0.00 0.00
25% 0.52 0.00 0.00
50% 1.00 0.96 0.95
udp 10% 0.71 0.48 0.22
25% 0.94 0.90 0.84
50% 0.99 0.99 0.9965
3.4.2 Measures for Detection
The previous section suggests that our regularity-based detection measures alone
fail to detect the presence of IP SCCs with reasonable detection rates given a mix
dataset. To detect noisy IP SCCs, we take the approach of identifying and elimi-
nating the noise from the mix dataset instead ﬁnding a measure that is robust in
the presence of noise. To do this, we need a more localized methodology that fo-
cuses on the suspicious segments of the dataset individually and also in relation to
each other. Therefore, we employ a sliding window methodology that traverses the
mix dataset using windows of size w and strides of size s. The idea is to collect
local information about each window individually, and also in relation to each other.
To collect individual and relative information about each window, we introduce the
compressibility-walk and the CosR-walk methods, respectively.
Once we identify the mixed dataset windows that are suspected to be generated
by a covert channel, we can then eliminate the other windows and apply our mea-
sures only on the suspicious window. Because our regularity-based measures work
eﬀectively for low noise levels, this local approach can potentially generate higher
detection rates as compared to the cases where we apply the measures globally.
Compressibility-Walk
Compressibility-walk traverses the mixed dataset in strides of size s and computes
the compressibility score for each window of size w. The windows are allowed to
overlap in cases where s<wand we investigate cases in which w is much larger than
the covert channel window (i.e., a noisy covert channel). Our claim is that because
the compressibility scores of the datasets generated by IP SCCs are higher than the
ones generated by legitimate channels, the windows that contain covert channels will
reveal themselves as peaks when plotted on a graph. As an alternative, we could
also devise an  -similarity-walk methodology, but we omit this approach because as66
we showed in Section 3.3, compressibility is a superior measure as compared to  -
similarity, particularly in the presence of noise.
CosR-Walk
In the next section where we evaluate our sliding window approach empirically,
we show that examining individual windows alone is not suﬃcient. Therefore we need
to investigate the relation between two consecutive windows, and to do so we need a
metric that measures the similarity between the two.
Compression can be used as a similarity metric, which is an approximation to
conditional Kolmogorov complexity [91]. Given two strings S and T, the conditional
Kolmogorov complexity K(S|T) is deﬁned as the shortest representation of S given
T. Intuitively, the more information S and T share, the shorter the representation of
S given T.
Compression-based similarity metrics have been used in various research areas [83,
92–96]. Let   be a compressor that approximates Kolmogorov complexity. In [92],
the conditional compression of S given T is approximated by the compression-based
distance measure (CDM), deﬁned as:
CDM(S,T)=
 (S|T)
 (S)+ (T)
where | is the concatenation operator. CDM is a dissimilarity measure. In [91], the
authors show that the CosR metric performs better than CDM, which is deﬁned as:
CosR(S,T)=1−
 (S)+ (T)− (S|T) √
 (S) (T)
Combining this metric with our sliding window approach, CosR-walk traverses the
mixed dataset in a similar fashion to compressibility-walk, only this time computing
the CosR scores for consecutive windows. Again, we allow the windows to overlap.
Our claim this time is that because CosR is a similarity measure, the score when one
window has data points generated by a legitimate channel and the other generated67
by a covert channel will be lower than the score when both windows contain data
points generated by a legitimate channel.
3.4.3 Empirical Evaluation
In this section, we empirically show that both compressibility-walk and CosR-walk
were successful in identifying hidden covert channels in mix datasets, although CosR
yielded superior performance (i.e., it was able to identity the covert channel in more
cases). In our experiments, we used the same setup and datasets as in Section 3.3. To
demonstrate the sliding window approach, we ran compressibility-walk on a WWW
dataset with 2000 data points, with w and s set to 500 and 20. The dashed lines
in top two graphs in Figure 3.16 illustrate the cases in which the dataset was purely
generated by a WWW channel. The solid line on each graph illustrates the results
for a 50% WWW mix dataset. Clearly, the peaks in each of the upper two graphs
show the location of each hidden covert channel. We conclude that IP SCCs will
reveal themselves as peaks as long as the compressibility of the legitimate and covert
channels are distinguishable.
Similarly, we ran our conditional compressibility method CosR-Walk on the same
datasets, with w and s set to 500 and 20. The dashed lines in the bottom two graphs
in Figure 3.16 show the results when the procedure was run on pure WWW datasets.
The solid line on each graph again illustrates the results for a 50% WWW mix dataset.
For this metric, a V-shaped curve in each bottom graph suggests the existence of a
covert channel. As expected, the locations of these channels are consistent with the
compressibility graphs.
To show that CosR-walk is superior to compressibility-walk, both methods tra-
versed an example 50% UDP mix dataset. In Figure 3.17 on the left, we illustrate one
unsuccessful attempt by compressibility-walk to locate the covert channel. The curve
on this graph appears to be ﬂat suggesting that no covert channel exists, even though
there is a covert channel hidden in the middle section. In contrast, the CosR-walk68
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Fig. 3.16. (Top row) Compressibility-walk results for (dashed) a pure
WWW channel, (solid) a 50% WWW mix channel. (Bottom row)
CosR-walk results for (dashed) a pure WWW channel, (solid) a 50%
WWW mix channel.
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Fig. 3.17. (Left) Compressibility-walk fails to identify the hidden
channel in a 50% UDP mix dataset. (Right) CosR-walk identiﬁes the
hidden channel.69
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Fig. 3.18. (Left) Compressibility-walk identiﬁes both channels when
w = 500. (Right) Compressibility-walk identiﬁes only one channel
when w = 1000.
performs as it should do and the covert channel is again identiﬁed by the signa-
ture V-shape as we illustrate on the right graph. This phenomenon occurs because
the compressibility scores for the UDP datasets are as high as the IP SCC scores,
which causes compressibility-walk to fail. (Compressibility-walk works only when
the compressibility score of the covert channel is signiﬁcantly higher than the legit-
imate channels’ scores.) In contrast, CosR-walk is a relative measure for which the
individual compression scores do not matter.
3.4.4 Limitations
We conclude the section with a discussion on the limitations of these two measures
in detecting noisy IP SCCs. In our experiments we used window and stride sizes that
gave us the best results. However, in reality both of our search methods are sensitive
to the choice of parameters w and s and choosing a window size larger than the
covert channel size may not reveal the channel at all. We illustrate one such example
for compressibility-walk in Figure 3.18. On the left graph, both covert channels are
identiﬁed by setting w = 500, whereas on the right only one covert channel is visible
by setting w = 1000. Because the size of the covert channel is not known at the time70
of detection, the methods need to be run with diﬀerent sets of parameters to identify
the hidden covert channels.
The time complexity of both methods is a function of data points n, window size w,
slide size s, and the running time of the compression algorithm C(.). Compressibility-
walk performs one compression per window and CosR-walk performs three. Hence
the running time for both algorithms is O((n/s)C(w)). Practically, compression is
an expensive operation and our implementation of the search algorithms compress
each window independently. However, the performance can be improved if some
compression information is carried over to the current window from the previous
window when windows are overlapping.
Lastly, one can always create a mix dataset that does not reveal the covert channel
hidden inside. One example is to use a scattered approach and hide short bursts of
covert channel communication throughout the dataset to create balanced windows
(i.e., balanced in terms of compression scores and similarity). Although this type of a
noisy IP SCC would be diﬃcult to identify, the resulting covert channel is rate-limited.
For example if Alice uses a 50% mix dataset to avoid detection, in reality this means
that the covert channel bandwidth is halved. Additionally, by forcing Alice to use
short bursts of covert channel traﬃc, we avoid a continuous covert channel between
Alice and Eve (i.e., Alice needs to switch between covert and legitimate channels and
both parties need to know which packets belong to the covert channel at all times).
3.5 Chapter Summary
A crucial step in covert channel design is to ﬁnd and exploit a shared resource
that is unlikely to be used as a communication medium by design. Less emphasis
has been given to hiding the traﬃc generated by these channels – the secrecy of a
covert channel mostly relies on the secrecy of knowing the shared resource. In this
chapter, we argued that once this shared resource is identiﬁed, unhidden covert traﬃc
can be distinguished from legitimate traﬃc in most cases because of the way in which71
event-based covert channels adjust the timing of the events to signal information.
We ﬁrst described our implementation of an IP covert channel, discussed the subtle
issues that arose in its design, and presented a discussion on its eﬃcacy. Further, we
showed that the regularity of a noiseless IP covert channel can be used to diﬀerentiate
it from legitimate channels and presented two eﬃcient online detection measures that
provided detection rates over 95%. We repeated similar analysis for “noisy” IP covert
channels in which legitimate and covert traﬃc were mixed to obfuscate the covert
traﬃc. We showed that our online detection measures failed to identify the covert
channel with a reasonable false alarm rate for noise levels higher than 10%. For such
channels, we investigated eﬀective search mechanisms to ﬁnd regions of the traﬃc that
appear to be covert channels. Such “local” methods are computationally expensive
and are thus best deployed oﬄine.72
4. TIME-REPLAY NETWORK COVERT CHANNELS
Time-replay channels hide the channel traﬃc in normal traﬃc patterns by replaying a
previously recorded or a speciﬁcally engineered sequence of timing intervals. In certain
cases, the event sequence generated by a time-replay covert channel can be equal in
distribution to the sequences generated by legitimate channels in the system; Thereby
creating channels that are undetectable through analyzing localized distribution of
inter-arrival times. Formally, a time-replay covert channel is an event-based covert
channel in which the timing intervals between events (i.e., inter-event times) are taken
from a sequence of values each of which is associated with a symbol by a rule and used
only once.
Time-replay covert channels represent a family of event-based covert channels
rather than a particular channel or a channel type. Therefore, a time-replay covert
channel can be categorized as a storage, timing, or a hybrid channel depending on
the number of diﬀerent events and timing intervals it uses. In this chapter, we ﬁrst
detail the time-replay covert channel deﬁnition, design, and operation in Sections 4.1
and 4.2. We provide a discussion on channel eﬃcacy and list the factors that af-
fect both channel accuracy and bandwidth in Section 4.3. In Section 4.4, we discuss
detection schemes that are applicable to time-replay covert channels in general and
investigate the conditions under which these schemes can potentially work. In Sec-
tion 4.5, we investigate the eﬃcacy of the existing channel prevention and elimination
techniques as applied to these channels and provide a discussion how the existing
elimination techniques can be improved.73
4.1 Covert Channel Deﬁnition
Time-replay covert channels replay previously recorded event activity using a sim-
ple but an eﬀective three-fold strategy: 1) obtain a pre-recorded event sequence as
input, 2) divide the sequence into k partitions, where k i st h es i z eo ft h em e s s a g e
alphabet, and associate each partition with a symbol using a set of thresholds (i.e.,
rules), and 3) send the symbol s by delaying for the amount of time indicated by the
timing value in the corresponding partition before generating the event. For example,
suppose that a malicious user Alice wishes to leak code C to an eavesdropper Eve
using a time-replay covert channel. Suppose C is composed of two types of symbols:
s1 and s2 (e.g., zero and one for binary code). To send s1, Alice chooses a timing value
τs1 from the s1-partition of the input sequence and generates an event after idling for
τs1 time. To send s2, she uses the s2-partition. Each timing value in each partition
is used only once. On the receiving side, Eve monitors the events. Upon observing
an event, Eve 1) calculates the inter-event time τ between the current and the most
recent event, 2) determines to which partition τ belongs, and then 3) records s1 or s2
depending on the decision in step 2.
In a time-replay covert channel, Alice’s sending routine takes code C and sequence
S as the inputs and generates a sequence of events ES with the message encoded along
with the inter-event times of this event sequence. To do so, Alice uses the rules R
that divide S into k partitions. A rule always applies to an interval of timing values
associated with a symbol, such as <t i,t j,s > where ti and tj are timing values
(ti ≤ tj)a n ds is a symbol. For example, if C is composed of zeros and ones,t h e
rule < 0,t median,zero> divides S into two partitions where partition [0,t median)i s
associated with a zero and [tmedian,t max] is associated with a one.O n ec a na l s oc r e a t e
a rule for a single timing interval by setting ti = tj. Applying R on C using S,t h e
sending routine generates a sequence of events that are transmitted to Eve. On the
receiving end (of the covert channel), Eve’s observing routine takes the observed event74
sequence ES as the only input and computes C by reversing Alice’s sending routine
operations.
For this channel to work, Alice and Eve must be able to pre-negotiate on the
rules, event types, and the encoding scheme. One alternative is to have the informa-
tion hard-coded in the covert channel software so that no pre-negotiation is needed
between the parties. A second alternative is to use another covert channel (e.g.,
an implementation of a storage SCC) to exchange the necessary information on the
ﬂy. In either case, Eve’s receiving routine does not need to know the original time
sequence S, but does need to know the rule set R.
4.2 Covert Channel Creation
Within a distributed MLS system that properly follows policy, an observer with
a LOW security level may still be able to observe the presence of HIGH network
traﬃc without having access to the encrypted contents. Assuming that Alice is a
HIGH sender, Bob is a HIGH receiver communicating with Alice, and Eve is a LOW
observer, the only information shared between Alice and Eve is the timing of the
packets traveling from Alice to Bob. The IP time-replay covert channels (TRCC)
we present in this section use this timing information to covertly transmit a secret
message from Alice to Eve by adjusting the transmission intervals of the network
packets Alice sends to Bob under the following assumptions:
1. Alice and Eve use a single covert channel to communicate, thus our research does
not address multiple channels that aggregate packet traﬃc to leak information.
2. Alice has a ready supply of network packets that she can send to Bob at any
given time and the channel protocol allows arbitrary sends from Alice (e.g., she
sends HTTP GET requests with arbitrary content to Bob who is a web server
with HIGH content).75
3. Our research does not address the cases in which Bob might become suspicious
as a result of the amount of network traﬃc generated by Alice.
4. The original payloads of the network packets transmitted over the direct channel
between Alice and Bob are legitimate, hence do not violate any MLS policies.
5. The raw data that ﬂows across the covert channel is binary but the actual
interpretation of the binary string is up to Alice and Eve.
6. Additional bits may also be included in the transmission for three reasons:
1) Additional parity bits may be appended to the data to add redundancy for
error correction caused by transmission errors (e.g., errors arising when a packet
is lost/delayed), 2) additional bits may be added for purposes of maintaining
synchronization between Alice and Eve’s event clocks, and 3) the covert data
may be encrypted to add a further layer of privacy and obfuscation. In our
implementation, we employ error-correcting codes but not encryption.
7. The covert message for transmission is subdivided into smaller blocks of binary
data, referred to as frames in this paper. An example frame consists of data bits,
synchronization bits, and error-correcting bits. While all the frames are of equal
length, the actual length, as well as the interval between frames, is inﬂuenced
by parameters of the encoding scheme and the network. In our implementation,
frames are composed of the eight-bit ASCII encoding of each character and an
optional six bits for error correction using (7-4)-Hamming codes.
8. We assume a unidirectional communication model for the covert channel. Only
the indirect covert channel is assumed to be unidirectional; The direct channel
itself is still bidirectional and the TCP/IP packets are ACKed. Assuming a
unidirectional channel means that Eve cannot communicate with Alice using
the covert channel itself. Restricting the channel to be unidirectional increases
the diﬃculty in implementing an error-free channel. In detail, Eve cannot 1)76
acknowledge the correct receipt of covert bits, 2) rate limit Alice, or 3) indicate
when to resynchronize.
4.2.1 Channel Design
IP TRCCs transmit a covert message from Alice to Eve bit-by-bit, hence the
replay channel symbol set is composed of zeros and ones. The lone event in the
system is the packet arrival, which is controlled by Alice and observed by Eve. To leak
consecutive bits to Eve, Alice generates a sequence of packets and encodes the covert
message by adjusting the timing between these packets (i.e., inter-arrival times).
To impersonate legitimate behavior further and to avoid generating regular (thus
anomalous) packet sequences, IP TRCCs adjust packet timings according to a pre-
recorded normal sequence. Therefore, in IP TRCCs, the choice of which inter-arrival
sequence directly impacts the secrecy of the channels and the better the input inter-
arrival sequence impersonates normal behavior, the more covert the channel. We
illustrate the covert channel operation in Figure 4.1.
We present three alternative IP TRCC designs; They diﬀer in how the channel
symbols are associated with the inter-arrival times:
Binary-Matching Channel (BMC)
Given an inter-arrival time sequence, suppose that Alice and Eve are capable of
negotiating a single cutoﬀ value τcutoff, for example the median of the sorted inter-
arrival time sequence as calculated by Alice. In the binary-matching channel (BMC),
the parties share one rule to partition the sequence into [0,τ cutoff)a n d[ τcutoff,τ max].
The inter-arrival times shorter than τcutoff are associated with a zero and inter-arrival
times longer are associated with a one. Alternatively, one can use a buﬀered cutoﬀ
value τcutoff ± δ to increase channel accuracy. In either case, Alice maintains two77
Fig. 4.1. IP time-replay covert channel. The example text is ﬁrst
encoded with a coding scheme and then sent bit by bit to the receiving
end. The message is rebuilt by decoding the bit-string.
bins; one for each timing value partition. On the receiving end, Eve does not need to
know the exact inter-arrival times, only the cutoﬀ value τcutoff and δ.
BMC operates as follows: To send a zero, Alice randomly chooses a timing value
τzero from the zero-bin and sends a packet to Bob (Eve) after idling for τzero time. To
send a one, she uses the one-bin for selection. Each timing value is used only once. On
the receiving side, Eve monitors the transmission line between Alice and Bob. Upon
detecting the presence of a packet traveling from Alice to Bob, Eve 1) calculates the
inter-arrival time τobserved between the currently observed packet and the last one, 2)78
compares τobserved to τcutoff ± δ, and she 3) records a zero if τobserved ≤ τcutoff − δ,a
one if τobserved ≥ τcutoff + δ, and nothing otherwise.
Rule-Matching Channel (RMC)
Arranging inter-arrival times as in BMC may lead to detection because similar
timing intervals are associated with the same symbol (i.e., short values with a zero
and long values with a one). The two other alternative channels that we designed use
more complex rules to hide the channel structure better. In the rule-matching channel
(RMC), we use k rules that divide n inter-arrival time values into  n
k  partitions. As
an example, one can use a sample rule set (0,τ 1,zero), (τ1,τ 2,one), and (τ2,τ 3,zero),
that partitions the inter-arrival space into three mutually exclusive blocks. Each rule
partition is associated with a symbol randomly, hence no relation exists between the
partitions.
RMC operates as follows: To send a zero, Alice randomly chooses a timing value
τzero from the zero-bins and sends a packet to Bob (Eve) after idling for τzero time. To
send a one, she uses the one-bins for selection. On the receiving side, Eve monitors
the transmission line between Alice and Bob. Upon detecting the presence of a packet
traveling from Alice to Bob, Eve 1) calculates the inter-arrival time τobserved between
the currently observed packet and the last one, 2) compares τobserved to the complete
set of rules, and 3) records a zero if τobserved belongs to a rule partition with a zero
association, a one otherwise.
Exact-Matching Channel (EMC)
The last alternative IP TRCC that we designed uses an independent rule for each
timing interval, which we call the exact-matching channel (EMC). The EMC rule
set is composed of 3-tuples such as (τ1,τ 1,zero), (τ2,τ 2,zero), (τ3,τ 3,one), etc. In this
scheme, there is a one-to-one correspondence between the rules and the timing values.
As in RMC, each rule is associated with a symbol randomly, hence no relation exists79
between the timing intervals. The EMC operation is identical to RMC, only this time
we have as many rules as timing intervals.
4.2.2 Comparison and Limitations
Both BMC and EMC are special cases of RMC where we have k =1o rk = n−1
rules to divide the sequence into two and n partitions, where n is the length of the
input sequence. In the rest of this chapter, we will mainly concentrate on BMC-type
IP TRCCs and refer to EMC for the sake of comparison. This is because BMC-type
channels have many design advantages over the other two as we list below:
Rule Negotiation: To initiate the covert channel, Alice and Eve need to pre-negotiate
on one rule for BMC, k rules for RMC, and n − 1r u l e sf o rE M C .
Rule Comparison: On observing a packet arrival, Eve needs O(1) rule comparisons
for BMC, O(k) comparisons for RMC, and O(n) comparisons for EMC to decide
on the observed symbol.
Correctness: For the correct operation of the channel, RMC and EMC need the
same timing values to be associated with the same symbols, whereas BMC
requires only timing values equal to the cutoﬀ value to be associated with the
same symbol. For example, in EMC, if τ occurs more than once, each value
needs to be associated with the same symbol s.I nB M C ,t h i si sg u a r a n t e e db y
design except the τcutoff value.
Accuracy: For the accurate operation of the channel, RMC and EMC need similar
timing values to be associated with the same symbols, which is guaranteed in
BMC by design.
Stability: Both EMC and RMC are unstable channels that are extremely vulnerable
to perturbations on individual inter-arrival time values caused by channel noise
or intentionally, whereas BMC is a stable channel that is not aﬀected by small
changes of each inter-arrival value.80
Given these observations, we concentrate only on BMC-type channels in the next
section where we discuss the eﬃcacy of IP TRCCs. In Sections 4.4 and 4.5, we
include EMC into our discussion to compare the two in terms of channel detection
and elimination.
4.3 Covert Channel Analysis
We assess the eﬃcacy of IP TRCCs in terms of bit/character accuracy (the number
of bits/characters transmitted correctly divided by the total number of bits/characters)
and channel bandwidth. Three factors aﬀect channel eﬃcacy:
1. Contention noise is the amount of non-covert traﬃc Eve observes in the covert
channel and can potentially reduce channel accuracy [9].
2. Clock skew is the amount of jitter in the network and can potentially result in
the loss of synchronization between Alice’s and Eve’s event clocks.
3. Sequence selection is the choice of which inter-arrival sequence will be used and
can potentially aﬀect channel accuracy.
In this section, we investigate the eﬀects of these factors on channel accuracy and
bandwidth, and present the results of our empirical study with diﬀerent choices of
inter-arrival time sequences.
4.3.1 Channel Accuracy
To evaluate the channel eﬃcacy alone and provide an upper bound on character
accuracy, we assume that IP TRCCs are free of contention noise. Thus, Eve is capable
of isolating the network packets generated by Alice and destined to Bob from the ones
originating from or destined to other users in the network. In this scenario, clock
skew and sequence selection are the only factors that aﬀect channel accuracy. Clock
skew in a network is mostly caused by varying network conditions that result in a81
slight increase or decrease in the latency between Alice and Eve (i.e., network jitter).
This factor can potential aﬀect the timing of network packets traveling from Alice
to Bob (Eve), thus reduce channel accuracy. For example, a temporary congestion
in the network can delay a packet further and change its symbol association at the
receiving side. Sequence selection also plays an important role in determining how
much damage clock skew can cause and the choice of which sequence aﬀects channel
accuracy. Ideally, in a sequence, timing intervals that are associated with diﬀerent
symbols need to be as distinct from each other as possible. As an example, in BMC,
Eve needs to be able to diﬀerentiate timing values that belong to the zero partition
from the ones that belong to the one partition. This depends on both sequence
selection as well as how individual timing intervals are associated with each partition.
In this section, we illustrate the eﬀects of sequence selection on channel accuracy
empirically.
An eﬀective way to remedy clock skew and sequence selection deﬁciencies is to
use error-correcting codes (ECC). ECCs add additional bits to the codeword that can
be used to detect and correct some errors in transmission [77,78]. The code rate of
an ECC is deﬁned as the ratio between the length of an original codeword and the
length of the codeword with added error-correcting bits. A drawback of ECCs is that
they increase the amount of information to be transmitted over the channel. In this
study, we use Hamming codes [78] for one-bit error correction.
4.3.2 Channel Bandwidth
Ideally, using sequences with the shortest inter-arrival times possible yields the
highest data rate. However, this rate is limited by three factors:
1. Alice’s packet generator is the bottleneck as she cannot generate packets at a
higher rate than the generator’s rate. Another limiting factor on Alice’s side is
the precision of the packet delayer. As we use shorter inter-arrival times, the82
delayer routine may fail to sleep precisely for the required amount of time. The
same constraints also apply to Eve’s observer routine.
2. In networks with jitter, the negative impact of clock skew on channel accuracy
increases as we use shorter timing intervals. This is because with short timing
intervals, a small variation on the interval may alter its symbol association (i.e.,
place it in a diﬀerent partition) whereas the same variation may be negligible
for long intervals.
3. Sequences that yield high data rates may be anomalous in comparison to normal
sequences in the network.
4.3.3 Empirical Evaluation
To assess the eﬃcacy of the covert channel experimentally, we implemented a BMC
prototype using the Berkeley socket library in Python. For one-bit error-correction,
we used Hamming codes that are computationally simple to encode and decode [78].
To calculate bit and character accuracy, we used an implementation of the Levenshtein
distance (i.e., the edit distance [80]). In our experiments, BMC replayed ten WWW,
FTP-data, UDP, and ﬁve SSH inter-arrival time sequences we extracted from the
NZIX-II dataset1. Each sequence contained 3000 data points and we eliminated inter-
arrival times longer than two seconds to avoid long delays between the packets. BMC
is capable of sending both binary and text data and we used ASCII encoding for the
latter. In both cases, BMC divided the resulting bit-string into eight-bit codewords
that were expanded to 14 bits when we used (7,4)-Hamming error-correction.
Accuracy Analysis
To get an upper-bound on channel accuracy, we ran BMC between two machines
on the same LAN to send the ASCII-encoding of the sample text listed in Chap-
1A collection of real world IP traces captured by the WAND research group [10].83
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Fig. 4.2. Character accuracy results for BMC replaying NZIX-II se-
quences with no error correction.
ter 3. We report the character accuracy results with and without error-correction for
all 35 NZIX-II inter-arrival time sequences in Figures 4.2 and 4.3 using histograms.
We observe that with no error-correction, 11 out of 35 sequences yielded over 90%
character accuracy and 14 sequences yielded less than 50% accuracy because of cer-
tain sequence properties as explained in the next section. With error-correction, 22
sequences yielded over 80% character accuracy rates, 17 of which yielded over 90%
accuracy. On average, error-correction yielded a ten percent increase in character
accuracy and we observed no speciﬁc advantage of using one type of traﬃc type over
another as sequences from each traﬃc type gave a mixture of good/bad results. (As
an exception, SSH sequences fared slightly better as four out of ﬁve sequences yielded
over 98% accuracy with error-correction.)84
Character accuracy with ECC
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
1 0 0 -90 90 -80 80 -70 70 -60 60 - 50 50 - 0
Character accuracy (%)
S
e
q
u
e
n
c
e
 
n
u
m
b
e
r
WWW FT PUD P SSH
Fig. 4.3. Character accuracy results for BMC replaying NZIX-II se-
quences with (7,4)-Hamming error correction.
Bit accuracy results followed a similar trend as we illustrate in Figure 4.4. Our
results show that, 22 out of 35 sequences yielded better than 90% accuracy rates and
the rates for the remaining sequences were uniformly distributed over the interval 90-
40%. We also observed that a sequence with bit accuracy over 90% yielded character
accuracy over 80% with error-correction. Additionally, as expected, bit accuracy rates
with and without error-correction were similar.
As a ﬁnal note, whether a 100% accuracy rate is necessary or not depends on the
application type. While an 80% accuracy rate may be suﬃcient for Eve to decode
a reasonably understandable message, 100% accuracy is absolutely necessary if the
covert channel is transmitting a binary and/or an encrypted ﬁle. Although, for the
cases in which 100% accuracy is not required (e.g., streaming traﬃc), the covert85
Binary accuracy
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
1 0 0 -90 90 -80 80 -70 70 -60 60 - 50 50 - 0
Binary accuracy (%)
S
e
q
u
e
n
c
e
 
n
u
m
b
e
r
WWW FT PUD P SSH
Fig. 4.4. Bit accuracy results for BMC replaying NZIX-II sequences.
channel can employ sequences that yield higher data rates at the expense of lowered
accuracy.
Sequence Analysis
In Figures 4.5 and 4.6, we illustrate four example NZIX-II inter-arrival time se-
quences we used in our experiments. We sorted the inter-arrival times and used a
diﬀerent precision for each graph’s y-axis to focus on the intersection point between
the cutoﬀ value and the sequence. In each graph, the solid line represents the cutoﬀ
value (τcutoff, which is the median), and the dashed line is the packet generator’s
minimum processing time (Pgen), which was 0.0044 secs for Python. (In Figure 4.5,
these appear to lie on the x-axis because of resolution.) The example sequences in
Figure 4.5 provided 98% and 96% character accuracy with no error-correction and86
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Fig. 4.5. Example NZIX-II WWW and FTP inter-arrival time se-
quences that yield high character accuracy with one-bit error correc-
tion. The solid line is τcutoff and the dashed line is Pgen.
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Fig. 4.6. Example NZIX-II FTP and UDP inter-arrival time sequences
that yield low character accuracy with one-bit error correction. The
solid line is τcutoff and the dashed line is Pgen.87
100% with error-correction. The results in this graph are as a result of three factors
that can be generalized to all BMC sequences: 1) Each sequence provides a good sepa-
ration of short and long inter-arrival times, 2) the cutoﬀ value intersects the sequence
at one point, 3) Pgen   τcutoff. In contrast, the example sequences in Figure 4.6
provided 0.23% and 0% character accuracy with no error-correction and 0.35% and
0% with error-correction. This is because both sequences in the latter graph violate
the above conditions – particularly the third, in which the packet generator cannot
keep up with the desired packet rate dictated by the input inter-arrival time sequence.
However, this is an experimental deﬁciency as one can design a faster packet generator
that will allow using sequences with short timing values. Further, Alice can devise
a more accurate channel by speciﬁcally engineering a more suitable sequence using
the original sequence. To do so, one alternative is to avoid the timing values that
are within the δ-neighborhood of τcutoff (e.g., the ﬂat lines in Figure 4.6). However,
choosing a big δ value can create anomalous output sequences that can potentially
lead to detection. A second alternative is to use the sequence as it is but ignore the
timing values that are within the δ-neighborhood of τcutoff (i.e., do not associate a
symbol with a timing value that falls within this interval). In this scheme, Alice still
sends packets with such inter-arrival times, but these carry no information bits. Upon
observing an inter-arrival time value that falls under this category, Eve updates the
arrival time but does not record any bits. The resulting channel is rate-limited but
is more diﬃcult to detect as compared to the former alternative.
As a ﬁnal note, one can speciﬁcally engineer an ideal sequence that follows all three
conditions we listed above for a BMC channel. However, in doing so, the resulting
sequence should not deviate from the normal sequences to avoid creating anomalous
traﬃc patterns.88
4.4 Covert Channel Detection
Detection is a common practice in secure systems to monitor malicious activ-
ity [14]. In this section, we discuss the detection of EMC and BMC-type IP TRCCs,
which represent two extreme cases of the generalized RMC-type channels. We investi-
gate the cases in which these channels are detectable/undetectable through analyzing
localized distribution of inter-arrival times.
IP TRCCs leak a covert message from Alice to Eve by replaying a pre-recorded
inter-arrival time sequence. Let Sin be one such sequence we want to use to transmit
a message text M. We can generate Sin by either utilizing a pre-recorded sequence
that is recently generated by a legitimate channel, or by producing a sample from
the legitimate distribution if no previous sequence is accessible. In the former case,
the ﬁrst line of defense could be to devise methods to determine if certain inter-
arrival times are the exact same ones that were observed recently. However, because
the covert channel window size is not known at the time of detection, this scheme
would need to employ costly search mechanisms similar to the ones we presented in
Chapter 3. Further, Alice can perturb the timing values deterministically (e.g., by
adding a constant to the timing values that is only known to Eve) or randomly (which
would only work for BMC at the expense of lowered channel accuracy) to by-pass such
schemes.
In this section, we focus on schemes that analyze localized distribution of inter-
arrival times sequences to detect time-replay covert channels. Suppose we are given
an inter-arrival time sequence Sin, a covert message M, and a rule set R. To generate
an output sequence Sout, Alice ﬁrst encodes M into a bit-string B (e.g., using ASCII
encoding) and chooses the timing values from Sin according to B and R as we detailed
in Section 4.2 and illustrate in Figure 4.7. Using this protocol, the channel generates
Sout, which is a permutation of the timing values in Sin chosen in a particular way to
embed B. Further, we assume that |Sout| | Sin|.89
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Fig. 4.7. Factors that aﬀect the output sequence Sout for a time-replay
channel: the input sequence Sin, the input message M, the encoder
E, the input bit-string B = E(M), and the rule set R.
Given this setup, Sin is equal in distribution to a normal sequence N by construc-
tion and we investigate whether Sout is also equal in distribution. If Alice can generate
Sout in such a way that this is true, then the channel is virtually undetectable through
traﬃc distribution analysis. If no such sequence can be generated, that is one can
always distinguish the distribution of Sout from that of N, a detection scheme can be
devised to detect the anomalous activity. In this section, we investigate the cases in
which Alice can devise such indistinguishable Souts and the cases in which this is not
possible.
Whether Alice can generate such an output sequence Sout or not depends on
various factors such as the input sequence Sin, the message encoder E(M)=B,a n d
the rule set R. Further, because the input sequence is a replay of a previously recorded
sequence, Alice does not have control of Sin. Hence, she can only devise a generation
scheme by choosing diﬀerent rule sets and message encoders. In terms of time-replay
channels, Alice can employ three types of channels (BMC, RMC, and EMC) that use
diﬀerent rule sets. Additionally, we show that by adjusting the encoding scheme, Alice
can ensure that Sout is generated by uniformly sampling Sin, which can potentially
preserve its distribution for certain distribution types (e.g., uniform distribution).
4.4.1 Detecting EMC-type Channels
First, we examine the case in which Alice uses an EMC-type IP TRCC to create
a covert channel that is virtually undetectable through distribution analysis under90
certain conditions. An EMC-type IP TRCC uses n−1 rules to divide the inter-arrival
sequence into n partitions, where n is the size of the input sequence. Further, Alice
arranges the channel rule set such that, given the symbol to be transmitted (i.e., a zero
or a one), the probability of selecting a timing value is equally likely for all remaining
timing values. In this setup, we argue that if Alice can also ensure the uniform
sampling of the timing values from Sin regardless of the transmitted message, Sout can
potentially be equal in distribution to Sin depending on the distribution type. A trivial
example is the uniform distribution for which uniform sampling produces an output
that is also uniformly-distributed. Another example is the Poisson distribution. It
can be shown that randomly tagging a Poisson-distributed sequence produces two
sub-sequences, each Poisson-distributed (see [97]). Therefore, if a parametric test
does not reject the null hypothesis that Sin is D-distributed, it will not reject the
same hypothesis for Sout.
Furthermore, in cases Sin does not follow a certain distribution and does not retain
a rigid structure (e.g., a timing value is always followed by a certain value), uniform
sampling can potentially preserve the structure of the sequence. This is because
a series of numbers (with no assumed distribution) and its uniform sampling are
equivalent under a non-parametric comparison. Thus, uniform sampling only reduces
the sample size but it can potentially preserve the structure. Therefore, if Sout is
generated by uniformly sampling Sin, a non-parametric test (e.g., the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test) comparing the two will not reject the null hypothesis that Sin and Sout
are drawn from the same underlying population.
One way to ensure uniform sampling for EMC-type channels is to make sure that
the bit-string that will be transmitted (i.e., E(M)=B) is uniformly distributed. This
is because it is B that determines which values will be selected from Sin. Because
Alice does not have control of the message M, she can only choose an appropriate en-
coding for the message, or use a transformation on B following the message encoding.
However, ﬁnding an appropriate encoding that will ensure the uniform distribution
of onesa n dzerosi nB is a hard problem as Alice will also need to take character91
frequencies into account. A simpler solution is to ﬁnd an appropriate transformation
T that will produce a uniformly distributed output BT when input any bit-string
B. One such transformation is bit-by-bit encryption. Indeed, Alice can employ a
probabilistic encryptor such that the transformed (i.e., encrypted) bit-string BT is
guaranteed to be indistinguishable from a random bit-string [98].
In cases uniform sampling preserves the distribution, Alice can devise an EMC
prototype that is virtually undetectable through distribution analysis by using the
following protocol:
1. Run the covert channel on an application port for which the inter-arrival times
are characteristically divided into several clusters (e.g., Telnet (Yes), Streaming
(No)).
2. Use an EMC-type channel with a recently recorded normal input sequence Sin
and a rule set R for which the probability of selecting a timing value is uniform.
3. Either exchange a session encryption key K with Eve or use a publicly known
bit-string as the key.
4. Encode M into B and encrypt B bit-by-bit with a bit-secure probabilistic en-
cryptor into BE using the session key K.
5. Send BE bit-by-bit using the covert channel.
However, uniform sampling does not guarantee preserving the distribution of the
input sequence for every distribution type. For example if the input sequence is
bursty, uniform sampling might fail to spot the windows in which this characteristic
property is observed. Further, for such distribution types how accurate the output
sample represents the input sample depends on the sampling rate. We conjecture
that the EMC-type covert channel is undetectable through distribution analysis only
for the cases in which Sout is a sample for which the distribution of Sin is preserved.92
4.4.2 Detecting BMC-type Channels
As we discussed in Section 4.2, implementing EMC-type channels and ﬁnding in-
put sequences (Sin) that are characteristically divided into several clusters can be
infeasible. In comparison, BMC-type channels are easy to implement channels that
are more resilient to the factors that decrease channel accuracy. In this section, we
examine the case in which Alice uses a BMC-type IP TRCC to generate output se-
quences (Sout) that are indistinguishable from normal sequences. BMC-type channels
use only one rule to divide Sin into two partitions. Further, Alice arranges the tim-
ing values such that, given the symbol to be transmitted (i.e., a zero or a one), the
probability of selecting a timing value is equally likely for all timing values associated
with that symbol. Again, if Alice can also ensure the uniform sampling of the timing
values from Sin regardless of the transmitted message, Sout can potentially be equal
in distribution to Sin depending on the distribution type.
Creating a uniform sampling scheme in BMC-type channels, however, is not as
trivial as in the EMC case. This is because, unlike EMC, the BMC rule set determin-
istically divides Sin into two partitions using a cutoﬀ value τcutoff,w h e r e a si nE M C ,
each timing value is associated with a symbol randomly. This diﬀerence has a major
eﬀect on the structure of the transformed sequence (i.e., Sout). As an example to
illustrate this eﬀect, assume that Sin is a Poisson-distributed sequence2. Again, it is
easy to show that deterministically tagging the sample points (as in the BMC case)
creates two sub-samples neither of which are Poisson-distributed (see [97]). There-
fore, a detection scheme could use a parametric test to determine that the output
sequence Sout is not Poisson-distributed.
The cases for which the input sequences are not from a particular distribution
also suﬀer from deterministic tagging. For example, consider the case in which Sin
is composed of a group of short inter-arrival time values followed by a group of long
values and so on. In this case, if Alice applies uniform sampling as in the EMC case,
2We are not assuming that normal sequences are Poisson-distributed but use this assumption as an
example.93
the output sequence Sout will not show the same behavior as the Sin as it will be a
mixture of short and long values that can be detected as anomalous behavior by a
detection scheme. To avoid this, Alice could choose an appropriate transformation
over B or Sout to make the output sequence look more like Sin. For example, Alice
can use redundant bits to increase consecutive zerosa n dones; hence, consecutive
short and long inter-arrival time values. Eve also needs to know the transformation
to apply the inverse at the receiving end.
In either case, whether the output sequence Sout shows similar structure to Sin
depends on whether Alice can ﬁnd and implement an appropriate sampler or trans-
formation on B or Sout. This depends on the distribution type (parametric case)
and how rigid the structure of the input sequence is (non-parametric case). However,
Alice has access to Sin, thus she can check whether the generated Sout resembles the
input sequence. Further, she can apply various transformations to determine which
yields the closest match to Sin.
4.4.3 Freshness of the Input Sequence
In the previous sections we assumed that Alice has access to an inter-arrival time
sequence Sin that is equal in distribution to a normal sequence by construction (i.e.,
it is a recently recorded normal sequence). This assumption is valid for systems in
which the normal behavior does not change over a long period of time. However,
for distributed systems in which network conditions change over time, Sin may be-
come outdated as conditions change and may no longer be indistinguishable from the
sequences generated under the new conditions.
In such cases, Sin can no longer represent the normal behavior and the output
sequence Sout, which is a permutation of the values in Sin, will also be anomalous.
Hence, a distribution analysis scheme comparing the distribution of Sout to that of a
normal sequence may detect the anomalous behavior, hence the covert channel. In
this case, Alice needs to refresh Sin to reﬂect the current conditions. For example, she94
can record a new sequence under the current network conditions to use as the input
sequence to the time-replay covert channel. In this case, Eve also needs to relearn
the sequence information to be able to decode the message correctly. In a BMC-type
channel, Alice only needs to exchange the new cutoﬀ value, which can be transmitted
to Eve using the channel. Upon receiving the new cutoﬀ value, Eve simply adjusts
her packet monitor that decides on the symbol. In an EMC-type channel, the entire
sequence needs to be transmitted to Eve along with the symbol associations.
4.5 Covert Channel Prevention and Elimination
Eliminating high-capacity covert channels is also a crucial requirement for trusted
systems [5]. In the previous section, we showed that time-replay channels can po-
tentially be hidden from detection schemes that perform distribution analysis under
certain conditions. Therefore, to counter these channels, one needs to ensure that
certain prevention and elimination schemes are in place. In this section, we present
systems in which time-replay channels can be prevented by design. We then investi-
gate two covert channel elimination schemes, jamming [11] and the network pump [12],
and provide methods that aid these schemes in stopping time-replay channels.
4.5.1 Preventing Time-Replay Channels
Time-replay covert channels are not applicable to every system. As an example,
consider the case in which Alice runs an IP TRCC on an application port that is
normally used to transmit streaming traﬃc. In this case, to hide the covert channel
Alice uses a recently recorded sequence that was previously used in streaming commu-
nication. However, it is easy to see that covert channels that employ such sequences
will be extremely error-prone. This is because the inter-arrival times generated by
a streaming application show uniform behavior over time. Thus, the inter-arrival
times cannot be grouped into well-separated partitions (e.g., short and long clusters)
as required by a time-replay covert channel. Therefore, we say that a time-replay95
covert channel is inherently prevented for such setups in which the normal traﬃc is
not suitable for covert communication.
In our empirical evaluation of the eﬃcacy of IP TRCCs in Section 4.3.3, we showed
that certain sequences are not suitable to be used in covert communication because
they provided extremely low character accuracy rates. These sequences suﬀered from
the fact that many values were grouped around the τcutoff value; thus, there was
not a clear separation between short and long values that would ensure that Eve can
determine which timing value belongs to which partition (see Figures 4.5 and 4.6).
Hence, sequence selection plays an important role in covert channel accuracy. Further,
if the normal sequences belong to the set of sequences for which time-replay covert
channels fail the system is inherently protected against channels of this type.
We argue that one can utilize this characteristic as a strategy to design systems
that explicitly prevent time-replay covert channels and event-based covert channels
in general. Time-replay channels use the diﬀerences between the event timings as
a medium to leak information. Contrapositively, if the time between the packets
(i.e., packet inter-arrival times) is uniformly distributed, time-replay channels can
be prevented completely. The main diﬃculty with this approach is that the packets
are generated and transmitted following a protocol and are responsive to changes in
the environment (e.g., network) conditions. One solution to this problem is to allow
packets to be transmitted according to the protocol but employ certain constructs
(e.g., a data pump) along the transmission line that could transform the inter-arrival
times to make them more uniform. In the next two sections, we discuss two such
existing channel elimination schemes, jammers [11] and the network pump [12], that
adjust packet timings to disrupt the channel in a similar way.
4.5.2 Eliminating EMC-type Channels
As we discussed in Section 4.2, EMC-type time-replay channels are unstable chan-
nels that are extremely vulnerable to perturbations on individual inter-arrival time96
values. As a result, one can eliminate these channels easily by adding small perturba-
tions to the packets traveling through the channel. Therefore, both jammers and data
pumps work eﬀectively on EMC-type channels without any modiﬁcation because both
schemes add a probabilistic delay to each packet disrupting the association between
the symbols and the inter-arrival times.
4.5.3 Eliminating BMC-type Channels
Unlike EMC, BMC-type channels are less aﬀected by perturbation on packet ar-
rival times. This is because in BMC, each symbol is not tightly associated with
a timing value as in EMC but it is associated with an interval (i.e., [0,τcutoff)t o
zero,a n d[ τcutoff,τmax)t oone). Therefore, small perturbations on timing values do
not necessarily change the timing value’s symbol association. For example, added
packet delays with a low variance (regardless of the mean) cannot eliminate BMC-
type channels because Eve observes relative timing values (i.e., packet inter-arrival
times) rather than the actual arrival time. This eﬀect is especially visible for chan-
nels that use sequences with a good separation of inter-arrival times into short and
long values. For these channels, both jammers and data pumps may fail to eliminate
the covert activity completely because neither scheme has a policy that observes by
how much the timing values should be perturbed. As a result, BMC-type channels
may survive these elimination schemes with a slightly lowered data rate. (The actual
amount by which the data rate is reduced depends on the amount of added average
delay to the packets.)
To eliminate BMC-type channels as well as EMC, elimination schemes need to
transform packet timings more intelligently to remove the associations between the
timing values and symbols. For BMC-type channels it is important that the timing
values are perturbed signiﬁcantly so that their symbol association can be disrupted.
One method to do so is to use a random transformation with high variance that results
in sequences with diﬀerent symbol associations compared to the original sequence.97
However, this transformation can only partially eliminate the channel because some
of the timing values (e.g., the ones that are most distant from τcutoff) can potentially
retain their original association. A more eﬀective way is to mimic systems for which
these channels are prevented by design and transform the sequences in a way such that
no separation into short and long values is possible for the resulting sequence (i.e.,
create sequences with more uniform inter-arrival times). Using such a transformation,
time-replay channels can be completely eliminated as the transformation additionally
disrupts the shape of the output sequence in a way a time-replay channel cannot be
deployed. However, such schemes introduce additional control over packet timings
usually at the expense of performance. Therefore, one needs to investigate the eﬀects
of these transformations on system performance to guarantee fair-scheduling of the
packets as an example.
4.6 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we introduced IP time-replay covert channels (TRCC). This is a
new covert channel family that hides channel traﬃc by replaying a previously recorded
or a speciﬁcally engineered sequence of timing intervals. We presented diﬀerent types
of IP TRCCs each of which utilized a diﬀerent rule set to associate time values with
the symbols from the encoded message (e.g., zero or one for a binary message). Our
analysis showed that the binary-matching channel (BMC), which has only one rule
to partition the timing value space into two, has many advantages over the other
two alternatives we presented: the rule-matching channel (RMC) and the exact-
matching channel (EMC). Accuracy analysis on our BMC prototype implementation
that replayed example sequences extracted from the NZIX-II dataset [10] yielded high
data-rates for some sequences and low rates for some others. We concluded that some
traﬃc inter-arrival sequences are more suitable for time-replay covert channels simply
because they provide a good separation of inter-arrival time values.98
To counter time-replay channels, we investigated detection, prevention, and elimi-
nation techniques. Our analysis showed that for EMC-type channels, a motivated user
can adjust the message encoder such that she can devise a channel that can poten-
tially be undetectable through distribution analysis. We also argued that searching
for such a transformation is more diﬃcult for a BMC-type channel because of the
way its rule set deterministically partitions the timing value set. We conjectured
that whether a time-replay covert channel is detectable through distribution analysis
depends on whether Alice can ﬁnd and implement a suitable sampling scheme that
preserves the distribution of the input sequence. Our analysis showed that certain
systems can inherently avoid time-replay covert channels because of the uniformity of
the inter-arrival times they generate (e.g., streaming traﬃc). We argued that one can
mimic this behavior and avoid time-replay channels by creating systems that explic-
itly transform their event sequences into more uniform ones. Lastly, we investigated
the eﬃcacy of the existing channel eliminating schemes such as jammers [11] and the
network pump [12] as applied on EMC and BMC-type channels. We argued that
EMC-type channels can be easily eliminated with current schemes as they are very
sensitive to changes in packet timing. For BMC-type channels, though, one needs to
transform packet timings more intelligently to remove the associations between the
timing values and symbols.99
5. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
A crucial step in covert channel design is to ﬁnd and exploit a shared resource that
is unlikely to be used as a communication medium by design. Little attention has
been given to methods for hiding the traﬃc generated by these channels – the secrecy
of a covert channel mostly relies on the secrecy of knowing the shared resource. In
this dissertation, we showed that traﬃc analysis can counter traditional event-based
covert channels, which do not employ any additional scheme to obfuscate the channel
further, although rate-limited and more complex channels can be indistinguishable
from normal channels through traﬃc distribution analysis. To prove this statement,
we argued that once the shared resource is identiﬁed, covert traﬃc can often be
distinguished from legitimate traﬃc because of the way in which event-based covert
channels adjust the timing of the events to signal information. We ﬁrst described our
implementation of an IP covert channel prototype, discussed the subtle issues that
arose in its design, and presented a discussion on its eﬃcacy. Further, we showed
that the regularity of a noiseless IP covert channel can be used to diﬀerentiate it
from legitimate channels and presented two eﬃcient online detection measures that
provided detection rates over 95%. We repeated our analysis for “noisy” IP covert
channels in which legitimate and covert traﬃc were mixed to obfuscate the covert
traﬃc. We showed that our online detection measures failed to identify the covert
channel with a reasonable false alarm rate for noise levels higher than 10%. For
such channels, we investigated eﬀective search mechanisms to locate regions of the
traﬃc that appear to be covert channels. Such “local” methods are computationally
expensive and are thus best deployed oﬄine.
In the second part of the dissertation, we introduced IP time-replay covert channels
(TRCC) that are a new covert channel family that hide channel traﬃc by replaying
a previously recorded or a speciﬁcally engineered sequence of timing intervals. We100
presented diﬀerent types of IP TRCCs, each of which utilized a diﬀerent rule set
to associate time values with the symbols from the encoded message (e.g., zero or
one for a binary message). Our analysis showed that the binary-matching channel
(BMC), which has only one rule to partition the timing value space into two, has
many advantages over the other two alternatives we presented: the rule-matching
channel (RMC) and the exact-matching channel (EMC). Accuracy analysis on our
BMC prototype implementation that replayed example sequences extracted from the
NZIX-II dataset [10] yielded high data-rates for some sequences and low rates for
some others. We concluded that some traﬃc inter-arrival sequences are more suitable
for time-replay covert channels simply because they provide a good separation of
inter-arrival time values.
To counter time-replay channels, we investigated detection, prevention, and elimi-
nation techniques. Our analysis showed that for EMC-type channels, a motivated user
can adjust the message encoder such that she can devise a channel that can potentially
be undetectable through distribution analysis. We also argued that searching for such
a transformation is more diﬃcult for a BMC-type channel because the way its rule
set deterministically partitions the timing value set. We conjectured that whether
a time-replay covert channel is detectable through distribution analysis depends on
whether Alice can ﬁnd and implement a suitable sampling scheme that preserves the
distribution of the input sequence. Our analysis additionally showed that certain
systems can inherently avoid time-replay covert channels because of the uniformity of
the inter-arrival times they generate (e.g., streaming traﬃc). We argued that one can
mimic this behavior and avoid time-replay channels by creating systems that explic-
itly transform their event sequences into more uniform ones. Lastly, we investigated
the eﬃcacy of the existing channel eliminating schemes such as jammers [11] and the
network pump [12] as applied on EMC and BMC-type channels. We argued that
EMC-type channels can be easily eliminated with current schemes as they are very
sensitive to changes in packet timing. For BMC-type channels, though, one needs to101
transform packet timings more intelligently to remove the associations between the
timing values and symbols.
In summary, the contributions of this dissertation are:
1. We presented an implementation of an IP covert channel prototype that eﬀec-
tively transmits covert information over the network using IP packet timings.
2. We introduced novel detection measures that eﬀectively detect both noiseless
and noisy IP covert channels (and all event-based covert channels in general)
using traﬃc analysis and force malicious users to either design more complex
channels and/or rate-limit the channel to avoid detection.
3. We introduced time-replay covert channels (TRCC) that are a covert channel
family that hides event-based channels, and argued that TRCCs are virtually
undetectable through distribution analysis under certain assumptions.
4. We discussed prevention and elimination techniques for time-replay covert chan-
nels that aid current elimination schemes in stopping these channels.
Additionally, we provided simple bandwidth analysis for both unhidden and hid-
den IP covert channels and investigated the eﬃcacy of detection and elimination
techniques through an experimental study.
5.1 Future Directions
Future directions one might take to extend this work can be grouped into two cat-
egories: Designing more eﬀective covert channels and increasing the eﬃcacy of coun-
termeasures against these channels. To design better simple and time-replay covert
channels, one alternative is to employ better synchronization techniques that can po-
tentially have a positive impact on channel accuracy. For example, one can employ
more advanced solutions for combating synchronization errors caused by clock skew
such as self-synchronizing codes and phase-locked loops (PLL). The former method102
employs encoding schemes that are speciﬁcally designed to detect the loss of synchro-
nization and to recover from this state (i.e., resynchronization). The latter method
is a closed-loop feedback circuit that is designed to track or synchronize an output
signal with an input signal in frequency and phase [79]. Both methods were proved to
be eﬀective in communications and could be applied to our channels to achieve better
accuracy. Further, one can implement faster packet generators that will allow the
sender to use inter-arrival time sequences with shorter timing intervals. Additionally,
one can extend this work by applying the same channel design principles to implement
other examples of event-based covert channels that use diﬀerent events to transmit
information. As an example, one can use the inter-arrival times of CPU requests to
design a simple or a time-replay covert channel and investigate the eﬃcacy of the
channel using techniques similar to the ones presented in this dissertation.
To improve the countermeasures against time replay covert channels, one can
provide further analysis on detection, prevention, and elimination schemes. An inter-
esting direction one could take is to investigate the cases in which Alice can devise
a scheme to hide a binary-matching channel completely and the cases in which this
is not possible. This depends on whether Alice can ﬁnd a way to imitate the input
sequence such that the output sequence shows similar behavior, regardless of the mes-
sage transmitted. Another direction is to investigate schemes that can help prevent
time-replay covert channels completely. To do so, one need to introduce techniques
that transform the inter-event sequences in such a way that it is no longer possi-
ble to leak information using the diﬀerences in timing values (e.g., by making them
uniform). Further, one needs to investigate the eﬀects of these transformations on
system performance to guarantee fair-scheduling of the events as an example.LIST OF REFERENCES103
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A. IP SCC SCENARIOS
Scenario I: To observe packet presence, Eve can monitor the shared communication
line at MAC level to see if there is any packet collision. If there is such collision,
she can deduce that Alice has issued a packet.
Scenario II: Another option is to monitor the shared communication line between
Alice and Bob at the physical level and observe the signal. If there is a high
signal, Eve can deduce that Alice has issued a packet.
Scenario III: A relatively diﬀerent scenario is to use the TCP/IP acknowledgment
(ACK) packets in MLS systems that allow Alice to notify the successful receipt
of a packet sent by Eve to Alice (write-up). In this case, the timing of these
ACK packets can be used to create a covert channel.VITA111
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